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A Bargaining Dynamic Transaction Cost Approach to 
Understanding Framework Contracts 
 
Juliet P. Kostritsky1 
Long-term agreements (“LTAs”) in the supply chain with information sharing 
provisions have been heralded as new ways of doing business. Recent scholars 
examine how these LTAs are structured and explain their emergence as a 
byproduct of a new deverticalized production economy and the increased 
uncertainty in an innovation economy.  
Much of the literature examining LTAs in the innovation and manufacturing 
context have conceptualized these agreements as a blend of formal2 provisions 
that enable informal enforcement3 in a variety of ways. Recent scholars have 
studied LTAs in two primary contexts—the innovation economy and the 
standard form contract LTA in a manufacturing context between Original 
Equipment Manufacturers and automobile suppliers.  
These scholars have treated these LTAs as new phenomenon and a new way of 
doing business that departs from the vertically integrated firm. Instead of making 
parts companies now buy externally and enter contracts to govern their 
purchases.   
Scholars of LTAs all start from the premise that these LTAs are all necessarily 
incomplete. In the context of innovation of a new product that is yet 
undiscovered, the contract cannot specify performance obligations because the 
uncertainty about the final product prevents this. In the manufacturing context, 
the uncertainty is different; it is about whether the supplier will effectively 
collaborate with the buyer to produce high quality goods by participating in a 
process of learning by monitoring that will improve quality and timeliness of 
production. The response to this uncertainty in each setting is to provide formal 
contract provisions that obligate the supplier or the innovator to share 
information. Innovation scholars posit that these information sharing provisions 
                                                            
1 Everett D. and Eugenia S. McCurdy Professor of Contract Law, Case Western Reserve 
University School of Law. Elizabeth Connors, Jessica Ice and Rachel Ippolito provided 
extraordinary research help. Thanks are also due to Liza Vertinsky, Professor of Law Emory 
University School of Law for her insights and to Stewart Macaulay and William C. Whitford of 
the University of Wisconsin School of Law for encouraging me to do the empirical research on 
this project. Peter M. Gerhart and Bill Whitford provided valuable insights on an earlier draft.  
 
2 See Richard Gil and Giorgio Zanarone, Formal and Informal Contracting: Theory and Evidence, 
ANNUAL REV. LAW SOC. SCI. 141, 142 (2017)(conceptualizing formality in terms of verifiability 
to a “third party.”) 
3 Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Braiding: The Interaction of Formal and 
Informal Contracting in Theory, Practice and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1377, 1415 (2010). 
 
 
2 | Page 
 
are “formal” and that they facilitate informal enforcement thereby resulting in a 
braiding of formal contract provisions and informal norms for enforcement.  
Some argue that such settings call for “low powered sanctions.”4 Others such as 
Jennejohn argue that braiding theory does not fully explain the diversity of 
arrangements that include unanimity requirements for decisionmaking,5 
Unanimity requirements in decisions are a specific response to threats the parties 
face such as entropy and spillover.6  
This Article takes a different approach. It draws on the literature of these scholars 
but suggests that another way to understand the arrangements parties enter into 
in a variety of settings to purchase or sell goods or to innovate on a product or 
drug can best be understood in terms of a bargaining dynamic that looks at how 
the private interests of the parties are turned into joint interests in the agreement 
reached. It is a mistake to talk about the form of a contract without first 
understanding the bargaining needs and positions of the parties and how those 
needs get reflected in the form of the agreement, given the options the party has. 
The form of the contract is not an end in itself. As a result in order to analyze the 
form that contracting takes we must understand the function that each party 
needs the contract to perform—the kinds of transaction costs that each party 
must minimize if they want to go forward with their projects. These costs include 
opportunism, asymmetric information, uncertainty, and other frictions such as 
entropy and spillover recently identified by Professor Jennejohn. Each party 
approaches the bargaining with its own private goals and will reach a bargain 
only if the benefits of achieving those goals through a particular contract type or 
form outweigh the costs which means firms are constantly looking for a contract 
form that will minimize its costs while maximizing contractual benefits. 
In this Article I examine the choice of contractual form through this lens of 
bargaining theory. The choice of contractual form depends on how each of the 
parties defines its individual interests and their willingness to sacrifice some of 
their interests in order to get a deal that advances other of their interests. 
Explaining the choice of contractual form must also include some factors that 
have previously been ignored in the literature: the need for a document that 
functions as a planning tool for the transaction.7 It will examine a range of 
reasons why parties would enter written LTAs including the benefits they offer 
                                                            
4 Id.  
5 These are common in the biotech pharmaceutical context. See Matthew J. Jennejohn, The Private 
Order of Innovation Networks, 68 STAN. L. REV. 281, 282 (2016). 
6 Id. 
7 As Bill Whitford explains, “When a new business relationship is formed (or a new product is 
introduced into an existing relationship), there is a great deal of planning by both sides.”Email 
from William C. Whitford November 7, 2017, Professor Emeritus University of Wisconsin 
School of Law to Juliet P. Kostritsky, Professor of Law Case Western Reserve University School 
of Law. 
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of facilitating planning while minimizing misunderstandings.8 The planning 
needs of parties will be greater in some settings than others. Another purpose 
that may underlie the use of LTAs that take the form of standard form contracts 
(SFKs) is to centralize the processes and standards governing the sale of goods 
in a uniform document whose costs can be recouped by repeated use over 
multiple transactions.9 It will also suggest that certain types of LTAs that take 
the form of standard form contracts (SFKs) drafted by Original Equipment 
Manufacturers (OEMs) offer other advantages such as “centraliz[ing] 
decisionmaking”10 SFKs by OEMs centralized “control over terms that need to 
be standardized for various reasons”11  
Using the bargaining lens the Article will seeks to identify explanations first for 
why parties to a transaction use a particular form, a purchase order or an LTA 
and second whether they use an LTA is a bespoke contract or a Standard Form 
Contract (SFK) LTA. It rationalizes the choice of form and the particular 
provisions in terms of how the LTA or other formal arrangement responds to 
problems or hazards that parties face when significant obstacle hinder explicit 
complete contractual solutions and how it serves other functions such as 
planning and centralization of uniform terms. 12 It offers a transaction cost 
minimizing explanation for the choice of form that is tied to the lens of 
bargaining theory.  
Although initially LTAs were thought to offer some security for buyers for future 
business, LTAs now place more requirements on suppliers than on buyers.  
Because buyers have been demanding more from suppliers in return for less than 
a binding commitment, some suppliers view the LTA as undesirable, prompting 
them to opt out of signing LTAs or to use different arrangements. 
This Article will consider alternatives to using LTAs and suggest that parties 
deliberately choose among several options for selling goods, including avoiding 
an LTA all together. It offers some tentative explanations for why and when 
parties opt for alternatives to the LTA paradigm with its information sharing 
                                                            
8 Id.  
9 Id. 
10 William C. Whitford email, supra note 7.  
11 Id. One reason might be to offer assurances to suppliers that all suppliers are treated equally. 
That might account for stickiness in the adopted terms. Id.  
12 The barriers to complete contracting are discussed in 
 Richard Craswell, The "Incomplete Contracts" Literature and Efficient Precautions, 56 CASE 
WES. L. REV. 151 (2005); Oliver Hart and John Moore, Incomplete Contracts and Rengotiation, 
56 ECONOMETRICA 755 (1988); Avery Katz, Contractual Incompleteness: A Transactional 
Perspective, 56 CASE WES. L. REV. 169 (2005); Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the 
Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies; Robert E. Scott and 
George G. Triantis, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of Contract Design, 56 CASE WES. L. 
REV. 187 (2005); Kathryn E. Spier, Incomplete Contracts and Signalling, 23 RAND. J. ECON. 432 
(1992).  
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protocols. It suggests that parties can rely on informal enforcement mechanisms 
regardless of whether they opt for an LTA or another means of exchanging goods 
such as a purchase order; therefore, there must be other reasons to adopt an LTA. 
It will examine whether some of the benefits offered by LTAs drafted by OEMs 
such as centralized control and planning and control of opportunism under 
conditions of uncertainty can be achieved by other written agreements such as 
purchase orders, at least when those agreements reference elaborate documents 
such as quality control manuals available on the internet.  
One advantage of the LTA with its information sharing protocols is that it makes 
more information available that can be used to informally sanction parties who 
misbehave.13 Where the risks to the buyer from not having information are great 
enough to justify the transaction costs of entering such long term agreements, 
buyers seek to enter LTAs. In terms of the bargaining dynamic lens, buyers may 
seek to control decisions by their managers by mandating certain standards for 
quality of supplier goods and they may also have an interest in signaling their 
willingness to offer similar provisions to similarly situated suppliers.14 The 
presence of large sunk costs whose costs would be hard to recoup without an 
LTA and a continuing purchase obligation that could help amortize the costs of 
the large sunk costs may explain why and when suppliers would agree to an 
LTA.15 In this case bargaining theory can help understand why the private 
interests of the parties, the buyer’s desire to control managers and centralize 
terms and the supplier’s need for protecting sunk costs could be turned into a 
joint agreement in the form of an LTA that would govern their relationship.  
This Article seeks to explain the “alliance diversity”16 arrangements in the 
supply chain context as different means for controlling contractual hazards while 
                                                            
13 Lisa Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts: Social Capital and Network Governance in 
Procurement Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL ANAL. 561, 586 (2015). 
14 Email Bill Whitford November 7, 2017.  
15 Such sunk costs may, for example, explain why automotive suppliers routinely agree to LTAs 
with information sharing protocols (interview with Susan Helper X/17) and why manufacturers 
of catalog products may choose to forego LTAs with information sharing mechanisms and operate 
purchase order by purchase order or insist on an LTA with a quantity requirement to protect the 
sunk costs from capital equipment investments.Interview 2/22. In the case where the supplier can 
sell the product to others, the risk to the supplier from not having information about the buyer’s 
reliability and competence might not be worth the negotiating costs since the supplier can easily 
resell the product to others. So the provisions of iterative sharing arrangements might be more 
important in a setting like pharmaceuticals where the parties need to make large sunk cost 
investments that will be lost or in the automotive supply context where suppliers may build entire 
plants for an auto company buyer. For a discussion of sunk costs and asset specificity and their 
implications for complete contracting, see infra notes x-y. 
16 Jennejohn, supra note x, at 282. Professor Jennejohn focuses on specific governance 
mechanisms such as veto rights that do not serve the same purpose as the information sharing 
protocols of “fostering informal constraints on opportunism.” Id. at 282. Rather, Professor 
Jennejohn finds that there are divere provisions which respond to unique and “multivalent” 
hazards. Id. 
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minimizing costs. The total cost minimization may explain why in some contexts 
“formal” LTA contracts may be cost justified.17 Both automobile suppliers to 
OEMs and parties involved in joint innovation use formal contracts that take the 
form of LTAs.18 The formal written contracts afford planning benefits and 
control of standardized terms across a range of suppliers for OEMs entering 
standard form contracts. So, although the context of these agreements differs, 
with OEMs demanding informational disclosures on cost and quality and 
innovation funding partners in the biotech/pharmaceutical arena demanding 
information on research progress and investment, what may tie these contexts 
together is that they both involve large sunk costs which means parties cannot 
exit easily. Where however the product is fungible and can be easily resold, 
parties may avoid the cost of LTAs and operate purchase order by purchase 
order. Since there are uncertainties in all three contexts, about the uncertainty of 
the quality of the product, the reliability of the counterparty and the product itself 
in the innovation context, and there are ways of achieving planning benefits 
without an LTA and ways to achieve standardization through the incorporation 
of quality standards of excellence available on the internet, sunk costs may be 
the differentiating factors that helps to explain why automobile suppliers rely on 
LTAs but makers of other products (some fungible, some not) often do not.   
The Article also suggests that using the bargaining dynamic to understand the 
parties’ individual interests and their joint desire to minimize transaction costs 
to maximize value can illuminate differences in agreements on such matters as 
the structure for resolving disputes. In the innovation context unanimity is often 
required for decisions made during the collaboration. Why would such 
unanimity be required in such contexts? And why would many agreements not 
require such unanimity?  And why, despite the presence of LTAs in the 
automotive setting would a leading researcher suggest that there were are not 
elaborate contractual mechanisms but instead a structure for learning by 
                                                            
Professor Gillian Hadfield and Iva Bozovic have explained the diversity of arrangements in a 
different way. They posit that parties in innovation contexts use formal and detailed contracts as 
a means “to coordinate beliefs about what constitutes a breach of a highly ambiguous set of 
obligations” when norms about what constitutes proper performance are otherwise absent. See 
Gillian K. Hadfield and Iva Bozovic, Scaffolding: Using Formal Contracts to Support Informal 
Relations in Support of Innovation, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 981, 981. Establishing such coordination 
permits identification of breaches and that in turn facilitates informal enforcement. Id. at 988 
where they suggest “formal contracting provides essential scaffolding to support the beliefs and 
strategies that make informal means of enforcement…effective.” 
This article is concerned with “alliance diversity” as well but it focuses on alternative strategies 
for exchanging goods, including the use and non-use of LTAs. 
17 Comments in survey refers to “administrative burden” of LTAs. 
18 Of course, purchase orders and acceptances are an alternative contractual arrangement that is 
no less “formal” even though it may not contain as many contractual provisions.  
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doing/monitoring that resolves around information sharing and benchmarking.19 
Why would that less contractual, more pragmatic approach premised on a way 
of operating be a win/win approach for original equipment manufacturers but 
not for innovation collaborators? Professor Jennejohn suggests one answer to 
this conundrum based on the need to exclude a counterparty from appropriating 
property. I suggest that a bargaining theory lens transaction cost minimizing 
explanation that builds on the need to protect property and sunk costs in 
situations where the uncertainty about continuing relationships makes a long 
term agreement without veto provisions less satisfactory for controlling 
appropriation at the least cost.20  
The Article also explores why these frameworks break down, and it ties both the 
diversity of arrangements and their possible breakdown to legal enforcement 
issues. It addresses whether, when and why, as the contract innovation theorists 
suggest, legal remedies should be restricted to “low powered sanctions.”21 The 
bargaining dynamic lens may also help us to understand which enforcement 
mechanism would be consistent with a transaction cost/value maximizing 
outcome for the parties. To resolve that issue of enforcement and to resolve what 
enforcement approach would be cost minimizing and value maximizing, the 
Article engages literature on the role of law intersecting with the informal 
enforcement of norms, analyzing both the experimental literature on crowding 
out22 and the law and economics of norms23 and the purpose behind norms24 to 
                                                            
19 Susan Helper, John Paul MacDuffie and Charles Sabel, Pragmatic Collaborations: Advancing 
Knowledge While Controlling Opportunism, 9, Industrial and Corporate Change 443 (2000). 
20 See infra. 
21 Professors Gilson, Sabel and Scott advocate for the use of low powered sanctions, at least in 
innovation contexts, and suggest courts respond “in uncertain environments by enforcing the 
chosen methods of mutual cooperation on terms consistent with the arrangements themselves—
that is by imposing low-powered sanctions designed to encourage compliance with the verifiable 
elements of the information exchange regime (and the informal relations it supports).” Ronald J. 
Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Braiding: The Interaction of Formal and Informal 
Contracting in Theory, Practice and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1377, 1415 (2010). But see 
Hadfield and Bozovic who suggest that even where parties to a contract for innovation use formal 
contracts, resorting to legal enforcement is largely irrelevant. The benefit to the formal contracts 
is not in laying the groundwork for legal enforcement but in clarifying the parties’ obligations for 
the purpose of informal enforcement, not legal action. 
22 Iris Bohnet, et al. More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust, and Crowding, 
95 The American Political Science Review 131 (2001). See Robert E. Scott, The Promise and 
Peril of Relational Contract Theory in REVISITING THE CONTRACTS SCHOLARSHIP OF STEWART 
MACAULAY (J. Braucher, J. Kidwell and W. Whitford, eds., 2013) 105, 112 at n. 35 (discussing 
literature on crowding out phenomenon).  
23 See Juliet P. Kostritsky, The Law and Economics of Norms, 48 TEX. INTERNAT’L L. J. 465 
(2013) (hereinafter Norms). Norms are best conceptualized as “self-imposed constraints that 
parties use to reduce..frictions” of exchange.” Id. at 467. 
24 In some instances norms exist to solve problems that are difficult to solve by contract because 
state enforcement is weak and the problem may be difficult to solve by express contract. One such  
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ascertain the proper role for law when informal enforcement exists in a contract 
with some formal terms. It suggests that the bargaining lens may also offer 
insights into what level of enforcement would be warranted in different settings.  
Finally, it uses insights on the diverse arrangements and the potential for failures 
to advise lawyers counseling buyers and suppliers in the supply chain.  
  
                                                            
 
problem was how to constrain shirking and opportunism by agents used by merchants in long 
term trade among the Maghribi traders when state enforcement was weak. Norms arose to 
constrain the conduct of agents. “Agency relations were governed by a coalition—an economic 
institution in which expectations, implicit contractual relations, and a specific information- 
transmission mechanism supported the operation of a reputation mechanism.” Avner Greif, 
Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders’ 
Coalition, 83 AMER. ECON. REV.  525, 525 (1993).  
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Introduction 
A firm vertically integrates when it internally manufactures parts or goods that 
are necessary for its final product. 25 Alternatively, firms can buy on the spot 
market26 or engage in a long-term relationship with another autonomous entity 
to acquire the parts.27 The question of how to obtain the parts or goods—the 
make or buy decision28 —has implications for the boundaries of the organization 
of the firm.29 One problem with buying externally is that it leaves firms 
vulnerable to holdup when there is bilateral dependency30 leading firms to 
vertically integrate. While vertical integration could constrain opportunism by 
suppliers, there are offsetting costs to integration.31  Because of the costs of 
integration as well as the need to collaborate on technology to reduce the internal 
                                                            
25 Ronald Coase suggested that transaction costs might cause a company to produce rather than 
buy thereby explaining the origins of the firm. Williamson expanded on this notion of transaction 
costs by suggesting that opportunism was a friction or transaction cost whose risk would cause a 
firm to vertically integrate. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 
91 (1985) (explaining non-standard vertical integration as a response to contractual hazard 
created by bilateral dependency).  
26 See John Paul MacDuffie and Susan Helper, Collaboration in Supply Chains With and Without 
Trust in THE FIRM AS A COLLABORATIVE COMMUNITY RECONSTRUCTING TRUST IN THE 
KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY (Charles Heckhauser and Paul S. Adler eds., 2006)(discussing buying on 
the spot market as one likely to  involved “low-bid competition” and “low asset-specificity.” Id. 
at 417) 
27 This Article will focus on bilateral agreements between parties in the supply chain but will later 
consider whether the presence of a network will affect the analysis.  
28 Alfred Chandler explained the decision to make product internally in terms of “competitive 
advantages” of the large firm who “could exploit economies of scope as well as of scale by 
diversifying their operations into other industries.” See also Robert Gibbons, Firms and Other 
Relationships in THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY FIRM (ed., Paul DiMaggio 2001); Naomi R. 
Lamoreaux, Daniel M.G. Raff and Peter Temin, Beyond Markets and Hierarchies: Toward a New 
Synthesis of American Business History, 108 AMER. HIST. REV. 404, 406 (2003). Oliver 
Williamson explained the decision to adopt non-standard vertical integration as a solution to the 
holdup problem. See WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note 25, at 91..  
29 “The economics of organization is devoted precisely to explaining when transactions are best 
coordinated within hierarchies and when spontaneously in the market—that is, to explaining the 
boundaries of the firm.” JOSH WHITFORD, THE NEW OLD ECONOMY 32 (2012).  
30 WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM.The Fisher Body story is an example of a company vertically 
integrating with Fisher Body to avoid hold up by a supplier.  But see Helper, et al supra note 19. 
Professor Helper offers another explanation for GM’s acquisition of Fisher Body. Id. at 452-60 
(explaining the acquisition of Fisher Body as part of an “effort to construct a variant…of a 
collaborative supplier system….” Id. at 459. 
31 Integration has costs “[b]ecause incentives are degraded and because neither assent nor selective 
intervention agreements can be costlessly enforced, acquisition gains are always attended by 
added bureaucratic costs.” OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 18 (1996).  
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costs of research and development firms to buy externally,32 inter-firm 
arrangements to acquire goods externally are making a comeback.33  
Relations with external firms raise two issues. First, there is the question of how 
the buy or sell decision will be arranged. If firms trade, what types of formal 
contractual agreements will they use and why? Two primary methods include: 
1. exchanging a purchase order and an acknowledgement and 2. entering into a 
long-term agreement or an LTA.34 There is a separate question of what form the 
LTA will take—will it be a standardized form contract (SFK) between an OEM 
and a supplier or an individually crafted innovation contract. In addition, what 
types of governance mechanisms if any exist for resolving disputes.  Initially, 
the LTA had offered suppliers some security for future business, but as buyers 
imposed more onerous requirements in return for less than a binding 
commitment, some suppliers are drawn to other arrangements.35  
Second, what informal enforcement do parties use to enforce formal 
(contractual) obligations, a phenomenon in the sale of goods first empirically 
examined by Stewart Macaulay.36 Some scholars today tie informal enforcement 
to a change in the formal governing agreements.37 Agreements include formal 
contract provisions mandating the exchange of information between the 
                                                            
32 See WHITFORD, supra note 29, at 18 (deverticalization and partnering with suppliers allowed 
firms “to leverage partner firms and core employees to compete in the high speed learning 
race….” See also MacDuffie & Helper, Pragmatic Collaborations, supra note x, at 419 
(explaining outsourcing as allowing one type of buyer, automakers, to “rely on specialized 
supplier expertise, rather than maintaining that expertise in-house.”  
33 Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Contracting for Innovation Vertical 
Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 438 (2009) (“the fear of 
holdups…no longer compels firms to vertically integrate”). 
34 As a preliminary matter, we need to define terms to describe the parties in these LTAs. The 
buyer is the customer who purchases goods from a supplier who manufactures parts or other inputs 
for a buyer. The buyer may also be an original equipment manufacturer like an airplane or a car 
manufacturer. The buyer and supplier are linked in a supply chain defined as “a network of firms 
involved in designing, producing inputs for, assembling and distributing a good.” see Helper supra 
note x, at p.  In some subset of these agreements, the parties may be involved in collaborating on 
a joint product. 
35 See infra.  There are still other arrangements not involving an LTA or a purchase order that will 
be later discussed.  
36 Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. 
REV. 55 (1963). See also Gibbons, supra note 28, at 186. Other scholars had noted the importance 
of informal enforcement intra-firm. See PETER M. BLAU AND W. RICHARD SCOTT, FORMAL 
ORGANIZATION: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH (1962) (noting “[i]t is impossible to understand the 
nature of a formal organization without investigating the networks of informal relations and the 
unofficial norms as well as the formal hierarchy of authority and official body of rules, since the 
formally instituted and the informally emerging patterns are inextricably linked.” Id. at 6-7.) 
37  
 
 
11 | Page 
 
parties.38 Some scholars believe that changes in the LTAs, including information 
exchange, herald a new way in which the sale of goods takes place.39   
These formal provisions for informational exchange in LTAs facilitate informal 
enforcement.40 The information, when combined with self-help provisions tied 
to the information, allows buyers to self-enforce, encourages cooperation,41 and 
increases trust levels.42 The contracts for innovation, another form of LTA, also 
include benchmarks for progress and funding obligations as well as general 
provisions obligating parties to act in good faith toward the development of a 
joint product.43 These provisions all result in a braiding of formal contract 
provisions and informal enforcement.44 This is because the provisions, whether 
setting up standard that a supplier must meet as in an excellence manual or 
complying with the obligation to work in good faith toward a product or 
investing in research and other provisions designed to guide the parties “to 
manage the behavior during the life of the relationship,”45 are all provisions that 
will enable the parties to self-enforce obligations. By providing a formal contract 
provision in an LTA that references excellence standards or provisions for 
“managing” obligations, the parties have built in standards46 to deal with 
uncertainty about quality or the product. The formal informational exchange as 
well as the innovation provisions guiding conduct and investment all constrain 
opportunism by raising switching costs for both parties,47 since if either party 
has to switch to a new supplier or a new customer, that party will have to explain 
                                                            
38 See Lisa Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts: Social Capital and Network Governance in 
Procurement Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL ANAL. 561 (2015). The information shared may relate to a 
supplier’s finances, quality, and engineering capability. If the firms are involved in collaboration 
and innovation, the information exchanged may also concern investments in research or funding. 
The latter exchanges are labeled as contracts for innovation. See Gilson, et al., Innovation, supra 
note 33, at 436.   
39 Id. at 431.  
40.Gilson, et al, Braiding, supra note 3, at 1384.  
41 Lisa Bernstein points out that information exchanges encourage continued cooperation by 
helping avert misunderstandings about what performance is expected. Bernstein, Beyond 
Relational Contracts, supra note 13, at 576-77. Dispute resolution mechanisms in some LTAs 
play a similar role in discouraging conflict. 
42 Id. at 593. 
43 Need cite.  
44 Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note x, at 1383. Gilson, Sabel and Scott classify these information 
sharing protocols as “neither fully formal nor fully informal….”; they are not formal because they 
are not based on calculated incentives applicable to performance obligations and not informal 
because not “a gift relation in which the parties simply and generally pledge to exchange like 
(information) for like.” Id. at 1384. 
45 Hadfield & Bozovic, supra note 16, at 987.  
46 Reference literature on rules vs. standards.  
47 These interfirm arrangements may have “situational advantages over competing forms.” 
WHITFORD, supra note 29, at 37. 
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their actions to a successor and bear the cost of switching.48 In addition to 
constraining opportunism by facilitating informal enforcement, LTAs may be 
valued because they provide a positive benefit: they help to cement relationships 
with a customer.49  
One unanswered question is why manufacturers of fungible products might 
operate purchase order by purchase order and eschew LTAs. Can such parties 
self-enforce without a formal LTA and can they achieve the benefits of 
constraining opportunism and assuring quality products without an LTA. Many 
of the provisions for assuring quality do not need to be part of an LTA. Instead, 
a short form purchase order can refer to a quality manual and require that “Seller 
also warrants that its processes shall comply with the John Deere Quality Manual 
and that the Goods will comply with all current industry standards….”50 Even 
without entering into an LTA a buyer can assure the same benefits of quality 
assurance in goods and the processes by which they are manufactured. Such 
purchase orders by incorporating quality standards from the web can also 
achieve the advantages of cementing buyer control of and standardization of 
quality, advantages that inhere in the SFK’s between OEMs and automobile 
suppliers.   
Some current scholars such as Professors Bernstein and Gilson Sabel, and Scott 
and Hadfield and Brozovic point to provisions in the LTA as a new means of 
insuring informal enforcement or of coordinating agreement on what constitutes 
a breach.51 But by simply requiring manufacturers to warrant in purchase orders 
that their goods meet the standards of excellence and that its processes comply 
with buyer requirements, the same overall goals can be achieved at lower cost. 
Such warranties could help OEMs streamline provisions that all suppliers had to 
comply with, thereby assuring suppliers of equal treatment.52 Why and when 
would the higher costs of LTAs be justified and what disadvantages might ensue 
from these LTAs?  
                                                            
48 Of course, switching costs occur whenever parties are doing business with one another since it 
will be costly to switch due to the costs of doing so. This would be true regardless of whether an 
LTA is in place or not. 
49 Interview with $2 billion manufacturer cited the desire of one section of the company to 
negotiate LTAs to cement relationships with customers who were not already doing business with 
the manufacturer pursuant to Terms and Conditions or a purchase order. The desire to enter 
conduct all business by LTAs was confined to one section of the company where the LTA was 
viewed as a “relationship differentiator” with positive effects. Other sections of the company did 
not follow the practice of uniformly negotiating LTAs. 
50See:https://jdsn.deere.com/wps/portal/jdsn/Applications?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/wps/
wcm/connect/jdsn_website/jdsn/business+processes/quality/supplier_quality_manual/supplier_q
uality_manual_index 
51 See infra note x. 
52 Whitford email. 
 
 
13 | Page 
 
Despite these new arrangements, parties’ problems in exchanging goods are 
durable ones. This Article will examine what is new in the production of 
products and the accompanying contractual agreements. However, it posits that 
more can be learned by looking at what is durable in terms of problems parties 
face, and by asking whether and how the new practices in LTAs comprise new 
solutions to old problems. By looking at the problems the parties face and then 
considering the individual interests of the parties and the bargaining dynamic, 
one can analyze why the parties would adopt various kinds of contracts with 
various provisions in order to maximize value by controlling contractual hazards 
at the least cost.53 
In devising solutions to problems, parties confront significant barriers that 
preclude the achievement of completely contingent contracts.54 Moreover 
judicial enforcement is too costly for most parties to litigate most disputes.55 
Parties have therefore always resorted to a combination of formal contracts and 
informal enforcement,56 even without the formal orchestrated information 
exchange that is at the heart of many LTAs. Despite the incorporation of 
information sharing in formal contract terms, the way parties enforce matters 
pertaining to quality may not be significantly different. What appears new is that 
the detailed information sharing provisions that facilitate informal enforcement 
are part of a “formal governance structure that regulates the exchange of highly 
revealing information.”57 The new LTAs may lower the cost of such informal 
                                                            
53 WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note 25, at 32-34.  
54 These barriers include bounded rationality, asset specificity and opportunism. The confluence 
of these characteristics precludes completely contingent contracting. See WILLIAMSON, 
CAPITALISM, supra note x, at 50-63 (detailing how asset specificity, bounded rationality and 
opportunism preclude completely contingent contracts). Steven Shavell defines a complete 
contract as one in which “the list of conditions on which actions are based is exhaustive….” 
Steven Shavell, Contracts in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY oF ECONOMICS aND the Law 436 
(Peter Newman ed., 1998).  
55 Macaulay, supra note x, at 15. The costs of dispute resolution have caused economists to 
question the validity of a system centered on legal centralism and prompted consideration of 
alternative governance structures and dispute resolution outside the legal system. WILLIAMSON, 
CAPITALISM, supra note 25, at 20 (questioning the assumptions of legal centralism).  
56 By 1962 it was uncontroversial (at least among sociologists) that “It is impossible to understand 
the nature of a formal organization without investigating the networks of informal relations and 
the unofficial norms as well as the formal hierarchy of authority and the official body of rules …” 
BLAU AND SCOTT, FORMAL, supra note 36, at 6. 
 
57 Gilson, et al Braiding, supra note 3, at 1382. Moreover, today, the product itself or the quantity 
might remain uncertain, and the formal contract provisions might relate to informational transfers 
while the product remains unspecified. 
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enforcement by making more information observable.58  Of course, they have 
other costs, such as the negotiation, lawyer and drafting costs.  
This Article differs from the contract innovation scholars and from scholars 
studying standard form contracts between OEMs and suppliers like Bernstein. 
Such scholars provide insight on how the formal informational transfer 
mechanisms can enhance informal enforcement by making more actions 
observable,59 by “coordinat[ing] beliefs about what constitutes a breach of a 
highly ambiguous set of obligations”60 increasing the number of actions to 
observe,61 and by recognizing the ways in which the iterative actions can 
endogenize trust62 and raise switching costs, thereby constrain opportunism63 
and make firms more competitive.64 This Article instead focuses on the fact that 
the form of the contract reflects the needs of the individuals to the bargain and 
the function that each party needs the contract to perform, the kind of transaction 
costs parties must minimize in order to maximize value. Thus, in some instances 
parties in the supply chain may opt out of LTAs even though they face many of 
the same uncertainties about the reliability of the counterparty and the quality of 
the product being delivered.  
Neither the parties’ choices among supply chain agreements (a bespoke LTA or 
an SFK) or their opting out nor the legal enforcement issues can be understood 
without recognizing the inescapability of the opportunism problem.65 While the 
protocols for information transfer enhance the buyer’s ability to compete, reduce 
uncertainties about competence and reliability,66 and allow the supplier to 
furnish a credible commitment, they can also leave the suppliers vulnerable to a 
buyer’s opportunistic exploitation of the information shared. The potential that 
these informational mechanisms might also facilitate opportunism suggests that 
there are additional costs posed by these mechanisms and under the bargaining 
lens, those costs would be considered by parties considering whether their 
individual interests would be served by a joint agreement that would servie 
minimize transaction costs to maximize value or whether the costs of the 
                                                            
58 The information exchange also makes “character and capabilities” observable. Id. at 1386. Once 
those matters are observable, switching costs are higher. Those higher switching costs constrain 
opportunism because a party would have to expend resources to find a new partner.  
59 Id. at 1399.  
60 Hadfield & Bozovic, supra note 16, at 281. 
61 Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 13, at 593. 
62 Gilson, et al., Braiding, supra note x, at 1386. 
63 Gilson, et al., Innovation, supra note x, at 486-9. 
64 Jane Winn, Discussion Draft for John Kidwell lecture at 7 (unpublished manuscript on file with 
author); Gilson, et al., Innovation, supra note 33, at 440 n22. 
65 WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note 25, at 30 (discussing opportunism as a characteristic of 
human behavior.) 
66Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note 3, at 1404 (discussing reliability issue); WHITFORD, supra 
note 29, at 96 (discussing importance of “competence uncertainty—the problem of getting 
innovation from suppliers who were once asked only to execute.”). 
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opportunism potential would suggest that (1) either no LTA be agreed to, or (2) 
certain provisions on cost sharing be omitted from the information protocols, or 
(3) that the parties privately “hedge”67 by not fully cooperating or sharing 
information to push back on opportunism potential.  
Because preliminary research suggests that not all parties in the supply chain of 
goods or product innovation utilize LTAs with formal information sharing 
protocols,68 the question arises as to why and when parties would adopt such 
provisions or when alternative arrangements might achieve their various goals 
at the least cost to maximize surplus. The choice of a governance mechanism to 
contain opportunism where asset specificity exists depends on which 
arrangement is least costly and surplus maximizing. I am researching the 
question of what arrangements various manufacturers use in a survey of 2000 
manufacturers in Ohio. In this Article, I offer some tentative suggestions tied to 
the bargaining theory,  transaction costs and asset specificity.     
This Article  will draw on research of others as well as my own interviews with 
Ohio manufacturers to examine arrangements in different settings69 and to 
suggest some possible answers to the choices about contractual form. By 
considering alternative arrangements in the supply chain involving both standard 
products and customized products involving large sunk costs, as well as 
innovation, this Article seeks to explain different types of inter-firm 
arrangements using a bargaining lens that considers the individual interests of 
the parties, the particular context, the durable problems faced by parties, and the 
transaction cost minimization of contractual hazard theory.  
Highlighting “alliance diversity”70 in the supply chain, this Article will examine 
how the parties can solve uncertainties of various types and achieve their goals 
with and without formal protocols of information sharing or investment 
guideposts. That choice of the particular arrangement will also depend on 
                                                            
67 WHITFORD, supra note 29, at 85. 
68 Interview 2/22/17. One factor is whether the risks to the buyer from not having information 
about the reliability and competence of the supplier are great enough to justify the transaction 
costs of the LTA and, further, whether the risks are insurable. For example, if the buyer has a just-
in-time production scheme and the buyer’s competitiveness depends on the supplier making 
continuous improvements and the buyer relies on benchmarking, etc. then the risks to the buyer 
of not having a wealth of information about reliability, quality and competence may justify the 
investment of laying out the protocols in an elaborate LTA. A similar cost benefit analysis for the 
supplier would assess whether the benefits of having an LTA outweigh the costs. What additional 
protections or benefits does an LTA offer that a sale by purchase order does not? What provisions 
are most important to a supplier and can they be achieved in some other less costly means? What 
downsides exist to entering an LTA?  
69 These contexts include: original equipment manufacturers and automotive suppliers who 
routinely enter into such agreements, manufacturers of parts for the airline industry, some of 
which are catalog orders, as well as intensely collaborative ventures in the pharmaceutical 
industry.  
70 Jennejohn, Innovation, supra note x, at 282. 
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whether that arrangement controls contractual hazards and achieves the parties’ 
goals at the least cost, thereby maximizing surplus for the parties.71 The value of 
the information sharing must be considered in conjunction with why and when 
the parties will opt for an LTA that includes information sharing protocols, opt 
out of an LTA, or choose another alternative72.  
Finally, the choice of how to organize the purchase and sale of goods may 
depend on whether a large Original Equipment Manufacturer (“OEM”) customer 
with bargaining clout demands that a supplier sign the OEM’s LTA. Thus, the 
                                                            
71 The choice described here derives from Williamson. He suggests that: “Transactions which 
differ in their attributes, are aligned with governance structures, which differ in their cost and 
competence, so as to effect a discriminating—mainly a transaction cost minimizing—result.” 
OLIVER E WIILLIAMSON, MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 12 (1991). See also WILLIAMSON, 
CAPITALISM, supra note x, at 1 (nothing “the transaction cost approach maintains that these 
institutions [of capitalism] have the main purpose of economizing on transaction costs.” 
72 The majority of companies taking our survey (54 percent) indicated that they utilize MSAs and 
LTAs less than 26 percent of the time in their dealings (see the graph below). Of the 47 companies that 
indicated that they ever used LTAs and MSAs, 30% indicated their primary concern in terms of a future 
law suit would be a provision to protect capital equipment or tooling costs. Additional concerns 
included indemnity for intellectual property infringement and damages caps. 
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power and market dominance play a role in whether the parties exchange goods 
using an LTA. 73  
The Article then confronts what are the parties’ expectations for formal legal 
enforcement, as well as, separate normative questions of why, when and how 
courts should lend legal enforcement and if so, of what type. Does the nature of 
the formal information sharing regime affect the parties’ expectations of legal 
enforcement or the court’s willingness to enforce the agreements beyond 
specifically enjoining parties to adhere to the information exchange provisions? 
Innovation scholars argue that the presence of these information sharing regimes 
means that courts should use only “low powered sanctions”74 restricted to 
enforcing the information sharing provisions, citing concerns that high powered 
sanctions could “crowd out” norms or informal enforcement. This Article argues 
that the choice of enforcement mechanism should be analyzed using the 
bargaining lens taking into account the individual interests of the parties and the 
parties’ joint interest in an agreement that will maximize value while minimizing 
transaction costs. That bargaining lens suggests that the choice of an 
enforcement mechanism should depend on whether legal enforcement would 
serve the parties’ joint interests of minimizing transaction costs, constraining 
opportunism and maximizing value. That means where the opportunistic conduct 
is brazen and easily detected, and failing to intervene and constrain it would be 
ex ante value destroying because the anticipated failure of courts to intervene 
later would deter parties from entering agreements or investing suggests that 
legal intervention would be appropriate. That approach is particularly true where 
the fears about crowding out are exaggerated.75 
Despite the theoretical availability of informal enforcement through reputational 
sanctions or through a network, networks or inter-firm arrangements can fail for 
a variety of reasons—raising the question of what legal enforcement scheme 
would be optimal in such contexts. This Article offers explanations for high 
powered enforcement using a transaction cost minimization approach. It also 
analyzes the crowding out phenomenon in the literature to see if and how it 
applies to the enforcement of obligations in the supply chain and whether its 
proponents' concerns are justified based on literature on the law and economics 
of norms. 
Finally, the Article offers advice for lawyers advising clients in the supply chain. 
Lawyers can add value for their clients by considering this Article’s insights on 
LTAs, both SFKs and bespoke innovation LTAs, governance and dispute 
mechanisms, and alternative agreements and advising their clients that the 
                                                            
73 Survey results confirm this hypothesis. 
74 Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note x, at 1415. But see Hadfield & Bozovic (suggesting unlike 
Gilson, Sabel and Scott that “we do not associate the role of formal contracting with the use of 
formal contract enforcement.” Hadfield & Bozovic, supra note x, at 1017.  
75 See infra. 
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choice of form should follow a consideration of functions, individual interests 
of the parties, whether an agreement will minimize transaction costs while 
constraining opportunism, the need for an agreement to guide and shape 
planning an enterprise, the need for constraining managers and offering parity 
of contract to suppliers and the elements of failed agreements.  
Part I will analyze the origins of LTAs in the new Industrial Economy. Part II 
will address the contracting obstacles parties face in all exchanges and the risks 
of opportunism in the supply chain that parties want to control. Part III will 
examine the legal issues surrounding these structures. Part IV will detail the 
distinctive features of the information sharing and supplier excellence training 
programs in many LTAs; examine whether these information-sharing protocols 
have always existed; and, examine if and why they were part of the formal 
agreement. Part V will examine alternative ways of exchanging goods and 
suggest reasons why parties opt out of an LTA but still achieve their long-term 
goals. Part VI will look at how informal enforcement can occur, either through 
a relational contract or through the parties’ position in a network, and can 
facilitate the transfer of information used to sanction counterparties, regardless 
of whether the parties opt to use an LTA or another mode of exchanging goods. 
Part VII looks at Network Governance as an alternative or supplement to 
relational contracts, LTAs, and other supply chain relationships. Part VIII 
examines how networks fail and why failure matters, and considers what 
solutions can address failures of networks. Part IX examines what the role of 
legal enforcement should be when parties are using agreements that are partially 
enforced by informal sanctions. Part X closes with advice to lawyers negotiating 
agreements concerning the supply of goods. Part XI concludes. 
I. Ties to the New Production Economy: The Demise of the Chandlerian Firm. 
Framework LTA contracts are new in some ways; they are tied to the new 
production economy and the de-verticalization of buyers. The vertically 
integrated firm that used to predominate—the Chandlerian firm—outsourced 
very little production except for fungible products.76 Firms did not want to 
outsource production with large sunk costs because of the fear that parties 
making important customized investments might hold up the vertically 
integrated firm by demanding more money for critical components.77 To avoid 
that holdup risk, firms in the early 20th century manufactured critical components 
inside the firm.  
                                                            
76 See Helper, et al., Pragmatic Collaborations, supra note 19, at 444. (explaining Albert 
Chandler’s “central theme…that the firm, and property in general, exist to reduce the hazards of 
collaboration that could not efficiently be overcome in market exchange.”). 
77 Id. (discussing asset ownership as “powerful instruments for limiting the extortion and 
deception that daunt cooperation.”  
 
 
19 | Page 
 
However, in this new production economy large buyers began outsourcing more 
products or parts of production as the need to collaborate on technology to reduce 
the internal costs of research and development has driven firms to buy externally. 
Although LTAs have existed between firms for decades, the formal provisions 
in LTAs78 for orchestrated informational exchange look different today because 
of changes in the production economy that prompt closer collaboration on jointly 
developed products.79 These collaborations comprise a network of firms that 
exist between markets and hierarchies.80 The de-verticalization of firms has 
made suppliers key players in producing goods and collaborating, changes that 
necessitate more complex contractual arrangements81 to govern the cooperation 
needed to produce innovative goods or to enhance the quality of existing goods, 
both situations in which development depends on inputs from each party.  
These protocols for information sharing benefit firms in several ways. Some of 
these protocols help buyers remain more competitive82 and ideally permit 
supplier and buyer to produce higher quality products.  
The exchange of information serves different purposes. By transferring 
knowledge, these protocols actually allow for a new way to organize production 
that “involves immense coordination of specialized knowledge.”83 The sharing 
of information in a creative venture allows parties to collaborate on a complex 
project such as developing a new airplane like the Boeing Dreamliner.84 It 
permits buyers to leverage information and expertise that they lack themselves.85 
It permits companies to “leverage” the expertise of external suppliers86 rather 
than developing it all in-house. It thereby reduces the costs of production for the 
buyer.  
. 
                                                            
78“[i]t is not uncommon for supplier qualification questionnaires to ask if the supplier is a 
‘certified’ supplier or any of its customers.” See Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts, supra 
note 13, at 581-2. Bernstein details the access that the customer as to information from the supplier 
(discussing buyers’ access to information about “quality control systems and quality control 
reports, and…its books and/or other records.” Id at 583).  
79 The challenges for contracting are significant sue to the need for “structuring transactions in 
the face of continuous uncertainty.” Gilson, et al., Innovation, supra note x, at 449. 
80 These firms may be autonomous but part of a network characterized by information sharing, as 
well as “[a] mutual orientation” and “the use of voice before exit.” WHITFORD, supra note x, at 
37.  
81 Gilson, et al., Braiding, supra note x, at 1392. 
82 Winn, supra note 64, at 7.  
83 WHITFORD, supra note x, at 35.  
84 See Christopher S. Tang and Joshua D. Zimmerman, Managing New Product Development and 
Supply Chain Risks: The Boeing 787 Case, 10 Supply Chain Forum 74 (2009).  
85 See Id. at 17 (discussing OEM’s reliance on “suppliers’ specialized technology”).  
86 Jennejohn, Innovation, supra note x, at 281 (“collaborative approach gives a firm access to 
external expertise without executing a full acquisition.”)  
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 Ideally, where there is a “mutual orientation,”87 these protocols can facilitate 
“communication and problem solving.”88 The new frameworks in these LTAs 
can facilitate collaboration and innovation in these inter-firm arrangements in a 
variety of ways. The “information sharing protocols”89 that characterize some 
LTAs are highly orchestrated and help to transfer knowledge, cost data,90 and 
information about quality.  
The transfer of information permits contracting when uncertainty about what the 
final product will look like-- a matter that is unknown and unknowable ex ante-
- precludes contracting on the final product. The modern collaborative contract 
thus presents an additional species of uncertainty not present when the product 
is fungible.  
The arrangements governing the sale of goods examined here may but not 
always involve highly “collaborative methods of innovation.”91 Regardless of 
whether collaboration is a key feature, all of these arrangements exist between 
markets and hierarchies. Often, they comprise long-term trading relations 
between autonomous partners. The question is why the parties operating outside 
pure markets and centralized hierarchies choose a particular form of alliance 
with a particular contractual arrangement.  
The knowledge sharing protocols that are at the heart of these LTAs allow the 
buyers to produce higher quality end products. Because the supplier is sharing 
information about quality during production, the buyers can engage in error 
detection92 and make adjustments to improve the quality of the production and 
head off problems before they arise93 and allow parties to coordinate on who 
must invest at what point.94 
                                                            
87 Id. at 37 citing Walter Powell, Neither Market Nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization 
in Barry M. Staw and L.L. Cummings (eds., Research in Organizational Behavior, Vol. 12) 
88 Id. 
89 Gilson et al., Braiding supra note x, at 1377. See also Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts, 
supra note x, at 581. 
90 However, one interviewee working at a $2 billion manufacturer indicated a real reluctance to 
share cost data with customers.  
91 Jennejohn, Innovation, supra note x, at 281. The contract innovation scholars have applied their 
analysis to Deere Stanadyne supply contracts where innovation was only a potential issue for 
future products.  
92 Helper et al., Pragmatic Collaborations, supra note 19, at 446. 
93 Jane Winn, Discussion Draft for John Kidwell lecture at p.18 (nothing shifts in “focus from 
arguing about who should bear the financial cost of mistakes to reducing the volume of mistakes 
in the first place.”) on file with author. Sometimes it can lead to collaboration without trust in 
which automakers outsourced mainly to cut costs. Later, automakers took a more "strategic" 
approach to collaboration. Josh Whitford, The Anatomy of Network Failure, 29 SOC. THEORY 151, 
165 (2011).  
94 Hadfield & Bozovic, supra note 16, at 281. 
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Gilson, Sabel and Scott tie the parties’ new arrangements to solving problems of 
information when there is a lack of preexisting trust in a highly uncertain 
environment,95 and where reputational controls may not work. The information 
sharing protocols "allow parties to assess each other's disposition and capacity 
to respond cooperatively...."96 Professor Jennejohn highlights benefits certain 
LTA provisions can have in solving previously neglected contractual hazards 
such as entropy and spillover.97 Unlike Professor Gilson, Sabel and Scott who 
find the concern over “the resolution of the holdup problem” to be 
“anachronistic,”98 this Article finds that concerns over opportunism may still be 
central for analyzing firms and their contractual arrangements under conditions 
of uncertainty and contractual incompleteness.  
II. Durable Problems Confronting All Exchanges and the Contracting 
Obstacles 
Although parties in the innovation economy encounter heightened forms of 
uncertainty — the product in the innovation context — the parties’ solutions, 
both contractual and informal, are still largely constrained by the reality of the 
world described by the new institutional economists. Regardless of the particular 
forces operating on the supplier and buyer, some of which might deepen the need 
for collaboration to innovate between a supplier and a customer and some of 
which might exert pressure on suppliers to improve the quality of the goods 
produced and some of which might relate to the increased uncertainty about the 
product itself, the parties in a supply chain face problems are the durable ones 
that afflict all parties to any exchange. The parties need to control these problems 
in an efficient manner to ensure a high quality good. 99 
This Article, in making the resolution of contractual hazards at the lowest cost 
central to understanding the variety of inter-firm arrangements, departs from the 
view that the braiding mechanisms mainly exist “as tools for fostering informal 
constraints.”100 Instead, the braiding mechanisms and the contracts used are 
adopted to solve problems or contractual hazards, while lowering the costs of 
                                                            
95 Gilson et al explain that the high degree of uncertainty about the nature of the product that the 
parties are collaborating on producing makes it impossible to specify the product ex ante. Gilson, 
et al., Innovation, supra note 33, at 435. 
96 Gilson, et al., Braiding, supra note 3, at 1382. 
97 Jennejohn, Innovation, supra note 5, at 314 (explaining that entropy refers to the fact that 
“resources must be spent to synchronize efforts and learning processes among tem members” and 
spillover refers to the fact that “parties cannot capture the full value of their assets without 
spending resources defining and policing asset boundaries.”) 
98 Gilson et al., Innovation, supra note 33, at 438 (discussing comparable hold up problem as 
“anachronistic.”) 
99 “One ought to produce a good product and stand behind it.” Macaulay, supra note x, at 63. 
100  Jennejohn, Innovation, supra note x, at 282.  
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achieving those goals so as to maximize surplus. If, but only if, the formal 
information transfer mechanisms and other provisions in an LTA improve 
informal enforcement and the parties’ goals without introducing other costs that 
would outweigh the benefits from the information mechanisms, then those 
mechanisms will be adopted and will survive. In some instances, informal 
enforcement will occur without the information transfer mechanisms.101 So, the 
question is why and when the formal information protocols in an LTA solve the 
parties problems more effectively than if the protocols were not present.  
In this broader comparative view, governance arrangements exist to solve 
parties’ problems and must be evaluated for their effectiveness and cost under 
Oliver Williamson’s discriminating alignment thesis.102 This broader view of 
governance as a problem solving device using the individual interests of the 
parties and the bargaining lens is consistent with Matthew Jennejohn’s insight 
that some contract provisions such as veto rights exist and can be rationalized 
not as devices to foster informal enforcement but to respond to “overlooked 
forms of transaction costs”103 what Jennejohn labels “multivalent” 
hazards104such as entropy and spillover.105 However, if entropy and spillover are 
problems that parties have, the fundamental question is what mechanism or 
arrangements would resolve those problems at the lowest cost. That is the central 
insight of the discriminating alignment thesis. So, when opportunism and 
spillover costs are involved, in evaluating any arrangement the parties enter to 
solve any problem, such as a formal veto right, one should ask: is that 
arrangement the most cost-effective way to establish foreground IP rights in a 
way that is equivalent to the right to exclude.106 Having property rights depend 
on informal enforcement would lead to higher costs for the parties and might 
diminish incentives to invest, thereby making veto rights the most effective tool 
for achieving the parties’ goals. With shirking and shading and other forms of 
opportunism, perhaps information transfer mechanisms can curb such behavior 
at a low cost and therefore might be the preferred means of curbing proclivities 
to produce substandard goods. The discriminating alignment theory helps 
rationalize why parties might rely on protocols to promote informal enforcement 
and in other cases adopt veto rights.  
The real question for any analysis of the supply chain is how the particular 
arrangements adopted by the parties function to solve the problems of 
                                                            
101 That is the key insight of Stewart Macaulay and Oliver Williamson and that is that court 
ordering ordinarily will not be efficacious to parties who will always use informal enforcement 
due to the prohibitive cost of judicial action. 
102 “Transactions differ in their attributes, are aligned with governance structures, which differ in 
their cost and competence, so as to effect a discriminating—mainly a transaction cost 
economizing result.” WILLIAMSON, MECHANISMS, supra note x, at 12. 
103 Jennejohn, Innovation, supra note x, at 353.  
104 Id. at 292.  
105 Id. at 314. 
106 Id. at 324. 
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uncertainty and opportunism endemic in all exchange relations, and most 
particularly when large sunk costs are involved. Thus, in evaluating these LTA 
frameworks, and looking at alternatives to LTAs, one must examine how 
effective they are in solving opportunism, promoting innovation, and resolving 
any other problems that the parties face. How do these arrangements achieve 
parties’ goals of getting high quality goods to the buyer while generating fewer 
benefits from cheating/shading in a cost-effective manner?  
Solving problems like opportunism is complicated due to three major contracting 
constraints parties face. Bounded rationality characterizes the human 
condition107 and it limits the ability to foresee future events and to predict future 
human behavior, thus making it difficult to solve problems by a completely 
contingent contract.108 In addition, if there are large sunk costs or asset specific 
investments,109 the parties may not simply exit to the market since they will lose 
their investment.110 Finally, parties have propensities to act opportunistically,111 
and if they are unable to control that risk directly by contract, parties to turn to 
other private strategies to accomplish their goals.  
In analyzing the role of framework contracts and why they take the particular 
form that they do today, one must first address the contracting obstacles that 
parties face in any exchange relation, including the supply chain framework.  
Suppliers and buyers face many types of uncertainty. In some cases, there will 
be uncertainty about the actual product that will be produced or purchased112 or 
there will be uncertainty about the quantity that will be demanded or 
purchased.113 Gilson, Sabel and Scott see the problem that arises with contractual 
innovation as presenting unique challenges due to uncertainty known as 
“continuous uncertain change.”114 When presented in a heterogenous market, 
informal relational contracting may be difficult to achieve.115 Complete 
contingent contracting will be impossible due to uncertainty about the end 
product.116 That uncertainty may even interfere with an alternative way of 
                                                            
107 See WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note x, at 45. “[e]conomic actors are assumed to be 
‘intendedly rational, but only limitedly so’” quoting HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE 
BEHAVIOR xiv (1961). 
108 WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note 67 (discussing “difficult contracting issues” where 
there is a confluence of bounded rationality, and sunk costs). 
109 Define sunk costs.  
110 Id. at 54 (discussing risk of contracts with sunk costs being “prematurely terminated.”) 
111 Id. at 47. 
112 Gilson, et al., Innovation, supra note x, at 435. 
113 Uncertainty about the quantity needed may cause parties to leave the quantity open in an LTA.  
114 Gilson, et al., Innovation, supra note x, at 449. 
115 This is because relational contracts ground by "tit-for-tat enforcement" may not work when 
there are no continuing relations. Gilson et al., Braiding supra note x, at 1395.  
116 Id. at 1382 n. 9.  
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organizing production—modularity117—due to the inability to specify “the 
relevant interfaces.”118 Those impediments help explain the solution of a 
contract for information sharing that permits a reduction in uncertainty about 
each other and the product.119 That would be particularly true in a 
pharmaceutical venture between a big pharmaceutical buyer and a small biotech 
company. Uncertainty would also be present where the buyer anticipates that the 
supplier will make incremental improvements to the product. Under these 
circumstances, the uncertainties may make it difficult to describe the product 
with sufficient certainty for contractual enforcement.  
1. Other Uncertainties: Asymmetric Information; Opportunism by 
Suppliers 
However, even if there is great uncertainty about the product being developed 
that can be ameliorated by iterative cooperative investments that may be 
achieved by formal sharing protcols, any analyst of organizational or contractual 
choices must address certain overall risks of opportunism that can mar the 
success of iterative cooperative exchanges. There are two kinds of opportunism 
that a buyer faces. One is that the supplier will not be forthcoming about what 
type of a supplier it is; the supplier has superior information about that issue and 
has a disincentive to share that information with the buyer.  This is the problem 
of asymmetric information or adverse selection,120 a term also used to describe 
insureds who know more about their riskiness than the insurer does. Buyers also 
face uncertainty about how a supplier will act over the course of the relationship. 
Economists call this behavioral uncertainty.121  Will the supplier produce high 
quality goods with a low defect rate that meets the customer’s (buyer’s) 
standards or will the supplier shirk and produce poor quality goods122? Will the 
supplier produce goods meeting the buyer’s excellence standards as they are set 
                                                            
117 Modularization is "a process driven by rapid product change and characterized by the 
deconstruction of product design into discrete subsystems or functional modules." Gary Herrigel, 
Emerging Strategies and Forms of Governance in High-Wage Components Manufacturing 
Regions, 11 INDUSTRY AND INNOVATION 45, 47 (2004). 
118 Gilson, et al., Innovation, supra note x, at 448.  
119 Uncertainty about the other party can be reduced without information sharing protocols in an 
LTA. Parties can take steps to demonstrate their cooperativeness. They will have incentives to do 
so to signal their worth to the other party.  
120 WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note x, at 47 (discussing adverse selection as a particular 
species of opportunism characterized by “the unwillingness of poor risks candidly to disclose their 
true risk condition.”) 
121 Id. at 57. 
122 Buyers also face uncertainty about the nature of the demand for their product which can 
fluctuate over a long period of time. Solutions to that uncertainty problem take the form of open-
ended quantity terms. 
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forth in a quality manual? Will a biotech company invest sufficient resources 
and effort to maximize the chances of success? Some of the information sharing 
protocols shift some aspects of judging goods into standards set by the buyer.123 
This risk of shading/shirking is same risk of moral hazard124 that a principal faces 
when hiring an agent: will the agent shirk and not exert the effort that the 
principal would like? It is a type of cost that inheres in all exchanges. Controlling 
that risk creates value and the devices for achieving good quality will be adopted 
if the costs of adopting them are less than the costs from non-adoption.   
The risk of the buyer receiving poor quality goods is a longstanding problem, 
but it may be particularly troublesome for the modern buyer. A buyer/assembler 
today is under great pressure to meet just-in-time production,125 and to achieve 
"continuous improvement"126 in its own production so legal remedies of 
rejecting goods manufactured by a supplier, asking for a cure, and then suing the 
supplier/manufacturer in court if the cure is not made may be too costly and are 
therefore unsatisfactory as a remedy. But all buyers, even buyers who predate 
the modern deverticalized production economy, faced the same problem of legal 
remedies being an unsatisfactory solution for shading or other forms of 
opportunism by suppliers. That incentivized buyers to investigate their suppliers 
before contracting and to reduce uncertainty about competence and reliability by 
continuously interacting with their suppliers or by investigating them or 
requiring them to prequalify or by requiring ongoing quality metrics through 
warranties made in each purchase order that the goods conform to the buyer’s 
excellence manual or by requiring adherence to certain production processes in 
the purchase order itself.127 The goal of quality goods can be achieved even 
without the benefit of formal information sharing protocols or other provisions 
in an LTA requiring a monitoring of the supplier’s processes. 
                                                            
123 Insight provided by Professor Liza Vertinsky, Professor of Law, Emory University School of 
Law.  
124 Moral hazard is a type of opportunistic behavior. In the context of insurance it refers to the 
failure of insured persons “to behave in a fully responsible way and take appropriate risk-
mitigating actions” once covered under an insurance policy. See Williamson, supra note 10, at 
47. Moral hazard problems also arise in the principal/agent context. Because the principal cannot 
directly observe the agent’s actions and because the agent cannot discern whether the poor 
outcomes are due to lack of effort or to exogenous events. See David E.M. Sappington, Incentives 
in Principal-Agent Relationships, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 45 (1991). “[T]he principal can’t 
observe...the level of effort exerted by the agent. See also Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economics of 
Agency in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 37-38 (John W. Pratt and 
Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985) (noting that “principal cannot observe the actions themselves 
but may make some observations, for example, of the output.”) 
125WHITFORD, supra note x, at 17–18 (discussing changes from just-in-time production).  
126Helper et al., Pragmatic Collaborations, supra note 19, at 409 n. 39 (discussing the questioning 
of routine as a source of continuous improvement).  
127 See John Deere purchase order.  
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2. Opportunism by Buyer  
Suppliers face parallel problems of uncertainty and opportunism by the buyer. 
They risk investing significant sunk costs in tooling or capital equipment for the 
buyer, the cost of which can only be recouped by amortizing the cost over a long-
term supply arrangement and then being terminated. They also face the risk that 
the buyer will falsely claim that the products are defective. The supplier faces 
other types of opportunism if the sharing of information results in the buyer 
sharing it with the supplier’s competitors or using the information to 
manufacture the item in-house using the supplier’s information. A buyer may 
also opportunistically expropriate information intended for joint benefits to both 
parties for its private benefit.128  
3. Entropy: Coordination 
Parties face other problems in these collaborative innovation networks. Professor 
Jennejohn has identified one: the risk of entropy. He defines entropy to “mean 
that resources must be spent to synchronize efforts and learning processes among 
team members.”129 The problems of communication can become particularly 
difficult when expertise necessitates developing “a shared language among team 
members.” 130 
When team members are separate, they face challenges of learning from the 
other party and “concurrency” a situation in which there may be a failure to align 
with the counterparty.131 This could occur because the parties “will get out of 
step” with one another.132  
When conceptualized as a distinct risk, different from the opportunism described 
earlier, then it makes sense to focus on responses such as methodologies that 
solve entropy through efforts to routinize coordination133 or through regular 
conversations134 to discuss problems. Parties might adopt a different strategy to 
the entropy risk: modularity. The latter technique avoids problems of 
coordination by actually lessening the need for interacting with the other 
                                                            
128Helper et al., Pragmatic Collaborations, supra note 19, at 444.   
129 Jennejohn, Innovation, supra note 5, at 314. 
130 Id. at 315.  
131 Id. at 320. 
132 Id. 
133 Helper et al., Pragmatic Collaborations, supra note 19, at 462-63 (discussing benefits of 
routinization).  
134 Id. at 474 (discussing tendency of “super suppliers” to be “engaged in discussion with their 
customers, with whom they speak by phone on average daily, three times as often as other 
suppliers in the sample.” ) 
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party.135 With modular design, the idea is that each partner is a distinct module 
that requires only a “standardized” connection. 
While Professor Jennejohn sees entropy as a distinct problem, in fact, entropy is 
like any other friction in a relationship. If it is uncontrolled, it will lead to a loss 
in surplus.136 Parties have to expend some resources to coordinate production 
and may adopt preplanned routines to reduce entropy. But if the routines do not 
work, there will be a breakdown and that can lead to significant costs that reduce 
surplus. As Williamson explains: “[e]ffective adaptation was what distinguished 
successful cooperative systems from failures….”137 The fundamental question 
remains why parties and when parties will opt for certain mechanisms in certain 
types of documents and why they will opt for different mechanisms in different 
settings.  
Promoting cooperation, facilitating the transfer of tacit knowledge138 and 
designing a structure for smoothly coordinating interactions between parties will 
lower the transaction costs between the parties. Techniques that will be discussed 
infra can anticipate and respond to the need to coordinate as a problem of 
contractual exchange.   
In many instances, however, when the coordination breaks down, it is a 
manifestation of the opportunism or shirking problem. In some ways, the 
breakdown is likely to occur when one party is not investing enough in the 
relationship. An analogy can be made to the employment situation by 
“distinguishing between consummate and perfunctory cooperation.”139 If an 
employee underinvests in effort, perhaps because the employee has been “forced 
to accept inferior terms, [he] can adjust quality to the disadvantage of a predatory 
employer.”140 The employee is performing under an incomplete contract and has 
the discretion to withhold high quality performance,   
A similar type of withholding of high quality investment and the close 
relationship between entropy and opportunism can be seen in cases where a 
buyer faced with managing a complex project, such as the Boeing Dreamliner, 
significantly underinvests in the mechanisms that will facilitate coordination. 
Failure of the buyer to invest in the relationship is an example of a buyer’s 
“perfunctory” commitment to cooperation and ex ante poses a significant 
                                                            
135 See WHITFORD, supra note x, at 37. 
136 See WILLIAMSON, MECHANISMS , supra note x, at  x. 
137 WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note x, at 5. 
138 Helper, et al., Pragmatic Collaborations, supra note x, at 464 (“Yet arms-length market 
relationships rarely provide fertile ground for the pooling of perspectives (or, put differently, for 
the process of making tacit knowledge explicit and shareable) that we identify as critical to 
pragmatic collaborations.” 
139 WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note x, at 262. 
140 Id.  
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problem for any putative supplier entering the relationship.  This type of 
opportunism will be difficult to control by contract.  
The interaction between coordination or entropy and opportunism can be seen in 
other ways. For example, buyers may institute mechanisms to smooth 
coordination by requiring the transfer of information. However, the mechanism 
designed to transfer knowledge or deal with a “learning curve” differential141 
between the parties may also present a potential for opportunism by the buyer. 
In short, a buyer may decide to appropriate the knowledge shared by the supplier 
to bring the production in house leaving the supplier out in the cold.142 So, a 
device meant to smooth coordination has the potential to pose an opportunism 
risk for a supplier.  
So, entropy is a type of friction which has the potential if uncontrolled to reduce 
the gains from trade. This paper will therefore treat it like opportunism or any 
transaction cost and hazard of contracting. In all instances, the parties will seek 
to design contractual or other organizational devices to reduce the friction. If not 
sufficiently controlled, the party facing the risk will react by withdrawing or 
hedging or failing to cooperate.143  
III. Legal Enforceability Are LTAs Enforceable and If Not, Why would Parties 
Ever Enter into Them? 
Before addressing how the LTAs respond to the uncertainties and opportunism 
outlined in Section II, we must confront whether LTAs are legally enforceable 
agreements. A secondary question is whether the LTAs need to be legally 
enforceable to address the asymmetric information and varieties of opportunism 
and other contractual risks or if there are provisions that can ameliorate those 
problems without the need for enforceable legal obligations. The third subsidiary 
question is why parties would ever enter these agreements if they were legally 
unenforceable.  
There is no one answer on the legal enforceability of LTAs in general. The 
particular document will determine its enforceability. If the LTA does not 
contain a quantity term and it is not a requirements contract, the general view is 
that the agreement is unenforceable.144 Specifically, the LTA would lack the 
critical quantity requirement necessary for a sale of goods transaction to be 
                                                            
141 Jennejohn, Innovation, supra note x, at 319.  
142 WHITFORD, supra note x, at 105 (noting tendencies "to see new managers pull the 
most profitable back jobs in-house"). 
143 See infra. 
144 Supply Chain Legal Reality: Why The UCC Is Sometimes The Worst, Part I (Or, Who Wrote 
This Thing Anyway) (Or, Traps For The Unwary) By Sarah Rathke on January 26, 2015 POSTED 
IN LEGAL ANALYSIS 
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enforceable under the UCC.145 Until the first purchase order is made, there is a 
risk that the buyer could refuse to make any purchases under the agreement and 
the supplier would remain vulnerable to that risk. But, once the first purchase 
order is made, there is a quantity and the purchase orders may incorporate by 
reference the LTA.146  
So, parties may first enter an LTA and subsequently exchange a quote, a 
purchase order and an acknowledgement. There is an interweaving of provisions 
that will apply to a particular sale executed under a purchase order which is 
legally enforceable since it will contain a quantity term. These provisions in the 
LTA may be incorporated by reference into the purchase order,147 for example, 
and may include information sharing protocols important for informal 
enforcement, limited buyer purchase obligations going forward, and some terms 
such as a damage cap, indemnity provisions and warranty limitations or 
disclaimers. The agreement consists of all of these provisions. 
Yet, even when the buyer has issued purchase orders, the buyer’s obligation 
going forward in an LTA may be unenforceable. The buyer in some LTAs may 
only commit to provide forecasts to the supplier148 and may specifically disclaim 
any obligation to purchase goods made by the supplier.149 So, there may be 
provisions that make the future purchase obligations illusory or qualified, at least 
until a release or purchase order is issued. In other instances, the buyer’s 
obligation will not be illusory. Rather, it will be conditioned on the supplier’s 
meeting certain standards of quality and price competitiveness150 and continuing 
to agree to annual price reductions. Since those decisions must be made in good 
faith, the buyer’s obligation could be a real commitment to buy, albeit one 
conditioned on meeting certain standards imposed by the buyer.   
Certain contract innovation scholarship focuses on how the formal information 
sharing mechanisms facilitate informal enforcement. It ties the increased 
importance of informal enforcement to the legal unenforceability of LTAs 
                                                            
145 The UCC has liberalized the requirements for definiteness in contract formation. “Even though 
one or more terms are left open a contract for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties 
have intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate 
remedy.” UCC § 2-204(3). However, the absence of a quantity term makes many LTAs 
unenforceable. 
146 Give example; Whirlpool? 
147 Get example if possible.  
148 Interview; see also Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note x, at 593 (noting 
buyer's "duty to provide non-binding rolling forecasts on a monthly or quarterly basis" (emphasis 
supplied)). 
149 See e.g. Section 2.1(c) of Master Manufacturing and Supply Agreement between Pfizer, Inc. 
and Zoetis, Inc. (October 1, 2012). 
150 Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 13, at 567 n. 15 (discussing competition 
out clauses that "provide if 'a particular part is . . . not a competitive value . . . .'" the supplier must 
take action (citing an anonymous interview)).   
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because these agreements might not obligate the buyer to buy anything. 
However, master agreements in the past often operated without a quantity 
requirement.151 Without a quantity term, the agreements were initially 
unenforceable, at least until the first purchase order made the agreement legally 
enforceable at least initially. 152 In today’s LTAs, the new element is the formal 
information sharing protocols. These formal provisions may or may not be 
legally enforceable. If the supplier promises information but the buyer does not 
provide a return promise to do anything, the promise to provide the information 
may not be enforceable. In this case, enforcement would therefore rely primarily 
on informal enforcement. However, even if the agreement had a quantity or if 
the purchase order incorporated the terms of the LTA making the LTA, and they 
were therefore legally enforceable, the main enforcement mechanism would 
remain informal because legal remedies are so costly.  
The resort to informal enforcement as the primary device for securing quality in 
the sale of goods context has not changed radically over time. In the past, 
information sharing or acquisition might have occurred informally rather than 
being the subject of a formal contractual agreement. Buyers would enter 
agreements and informally request information about supplier quality from other 
buyers or the suppliers, have the supplier pre-qualify before bidding, or rely on 
the supplier’s reputation. Yet, there were not as many formal provisions for 
suppliers sharing that information on a continuing basis.   
Today, even though many provisions for information sharing or audits or 
inspections at supplier’s plants are now orchestrated in a formal document, the 
provisions remain largely self-enforcing. If the buyer today is dissatisfied with 
quality, it may refuse to buy. However, because the provision on quality is tied 
to the buyer’s own metrics of excellence, a supplier would have difficulty suing 
a buyer for refusing to take its products. The resort would be to self-help rather 
than the judicial system. The supplier would be incentivized to self-police to 
meet quality or risk a loss of future business. In older agreements, even without 
                                                            
151 IAN AYRES AND GREGORY KLASS, STUDIES IN CONTRACT Law 150 (9th edition)(explaining 
[f]requently parties do business for an extended period of time under an arrangement where 
…neither party makes a promise to the other. Here there is no contract until one party offers to 
sell or to buy and the other accepts the proposal.”) 
152 See UCC 2-201. See Crown Battery Mfg. Co. v. Club Car, Inc., No. 3:12CV2158, 2014 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 18907, at *12–13 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 14, 2014) (explaining that MSAs is not necessarily 
a requirements contract when it does not establish a specified sale. Rather, MSAs establish terms 
for future purchase orders and “each purchase order forms a separate and distinct sales contract.”) 
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as many formal sharing information protocols, the consequences of displeasing 
the buyer were the same: the loss of business or a reputational sanction.  
There are two answers to the question of why parties might enter unenforceable 
agreements. These answers tie back to the bargaining lens in which parties 
understand the function the contract must perform to achieve their individual 
interests and then weigh whether the benefits of achieving their goals through a 
particular form of contract outweigh the costs. First, when the future purchase 
order is made, the LTA becomes enforceable at least with respect to the actual 
product purchased.153 What may be most important to the supplier is not the 
continuing obligation to buy or provisions regarding quality because these are 
likely to be enforced informally. Rather, what may be most important to the 
supplier are provisions in the LTA which will become enforceable as soon as a 
product is purchased pursuant to the LTA. These could include provisions that 
limit damages with a capped amount, eliminate consequential damages, or 
provisions that limit warranties or indemnify the supplier against improper use 
of the product by the buyer that could result in large damages. Examples include 
products like an airplane or medical device, as the damages in such cases can be 
extraordinary.  
Second, these arrangements offer suppliers with large sunk costs the security of 
a long-term formal arrangement. Suppliers with large asset specific investments 
need to recoup or amortize their investment costs over several years. These 
arrangements are standard between OEMs and automotive suppliers. Sometimes 
these contracts incorporate an “out” that allows the buyer to terminate for 
convenience or when the products do not meet the buyer’s standards for 
excellence.  
Even with those limitations on the buyer’s purchase obligations, LTAs offer 
important security to suppliers.154 The bargaining lens applies here.  Even if the 
purchase obligation is qualified, the supplier can plan ahead, knowing that if it 
keeps its products to a level of excellence or remains price competitive, the buyer 
will likely buy its products. The LTA, even if it is unenforceable, will offer 
security by cementing a relationship with a customer.155 Further, the buyer will 
have a hard time arguing that it is not obligated to buy if the outlined conditions 
for purchasing are met. The supplier can control that hazard by monitoring the 
behavior of its agents and employees and by maintaining a competitive price. 
Implicit trust may build up and may constrain the buyer from terminating. 
Alternatively, the implicit trust may mean that if the buyer does terminate for 
                                                            
153 The purchase order may incorporate the LTA provisions and those provisions would then apply 
to the product purchased pursuant to a purchase order.  
154 Susan Helper interview on 2/21/17. See also Helper et al., Pragmatic Collaborations, supra 
note x, at 476 (Feb. 21, 2017) (discussing Donnelly’s expansion into side mirrors after rear view 
mirror contract terminated?) 
155 Interview 8/22/17. 
 
 
32 | Page 
 
reasons beyond its control, it may offer the supplier another job even though it 
is not mandated by the contract.156 In addition, even if an OEM with an LTA is 
not legally obligated to do so, it may decide to finance some improvement.157 
Suppliers may be encouraged to invest given the implicit contracting relationship 
created by the LTA. All of these benefits suggest that the cost of negotiating an 
LTA might be outweighed by the benefits of a secure commitment (although 
legally unenforceable) and other benefits such as cementing a relationship. 
Third, the supplier may have no choice but to agree since many large OEMs or 
other large global buyers dictate that suppliers submit to LTAs.  
Finally, since the parties rarely expect to resort to legal enforcement regardless 
of whether an LTA or a less detailed purchase order is entered into, the question 
will resolve into whether the higher transaction costs, including lawyer time, are 
justified by the benefits that can be achieved by laying out the obligations of the 
supplier in a systematic fashion in an LTA. What are the offsetting benefits to 
buyers including increased security of the commitment and increased probability 
of recouping large sunk costs.  
IV. Advantages Offered by LTAs: Foundational Mechanisms for Informal 
Enforcement and Solving Uncertainties  
1. Controlling Contractual Hazards Under Conditions of Uncertainty 
A. Reducing Uncertainties Given Limits on Contracting and Promoting 
Low Cost Informal Enforcement 
The design of the LTAs responds to the durable problems in all exchanges—
uncertainty, bounded rationality, sunk costs and opportunism—outlined in 
Section II. LTAs help solve these problems of exchange but “indirectly.”158 The 
provisions on information sharing do not function to set up a possible breach of 
a performance obligation for purpose of initiating a lawsuit159 but rather to 
facilitate informal enforcement.160 The information sharing mechanisms in 
                                                            
156 Interview. Id.  
157 See supra note x. 
158 Jennejohn explains the view of Gilson et al. that the “formal contract only indirectly governs 
collaborations by fostering informal constraints on opportunism.” Jennejohn, Innovation, supra 
note x, at 282. 
159 See Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 13, at 562. The agreement could not 
be structured to enforce the production of the ultimate product in a collaboration for an innovative 
product that might never be produced.  
160 Jennejohn, Innovation, supra note x, at 282 (noting that the information protocols do not 
“determine performance obligations…” Hadfield and Bozovic however suggest that formal 
provisions in contracts help to determine if there is a performance breach which is then informally 
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LTAs constitute the formal provisions in the agreement, and they provide the 
information that is useful in administering informal sanctions against the other 
party. Professors Scott, Gilson and Sabel label this as “braiding”161 to describe 
the formal terms and informal enforcement combining. 
In evaluating LTAs, scholars of contracts for innovation have demonstrated the 
ways that new devices of information sharing can achieve advantages for the 
parties that cannot be achieved by a formal contract with a rigid performance 
obligation. For example, a complete contract would not be feasible in innovation 
contexts, because the contours of the performance obligation are undetermined 
at the start of the contract. Where heightened uncertainty about the project’s 
contours makes it difficult “to observe whether particular actions are cooperative 
or not, and also hard for courts to determine ex post what counts as a good 
outcome….”162 Information protocols committing both parties to invest 
encourages continued cooperation and results in a “braiding” of formal and 
informal enforcement.163   
There is a spectrum of differences in the level of uncertainty affecting the sale 
of goods. In some cases, there is extreme uncertainty about the final product with 
collaborative innovation. Sometimes, there is less but still very real uncertainty 
when the supplier is incrementally improving the products it sells. At other 
times, there is no uncertainty about the product but still uncertainty about the 
quality of the good that will be delivered.  
Do the heightened uncertainties in collaborative innovation ventures mean that 
the information sharing protocols will solve those problems more efficiently than 
other mechanisms and maximize surplus? Are there other factors in the 
innovation context that make adoption of such protocols important for achieving 
the parties’ joint interests, such as a need for a planning document to govern a 
highly complex project?  Are the uncertainties regarding the nature of the 
product any different from other uncertainties that generally afflict the supply 
chain such as behavioral uncertainty about the potential for shirking?164 In both 
cases, uncertainty about a product being developed or uncertainty about future 
quality of the product will result in an incomplete contract. Whether the parties 
use an LTA or some other agreement, such as a purchase order, and what type 
of LTA they adopt is a deliberate choice and will likely depend on the bargaining 
in which parties consider their individual interests and determine whether the 
benefits of achieving those goals through an LTA or another form will minimize 
                                                            
sanctioned. Even when the product was known and agreement drafted, rarely did parties sue over 
an alleged breach of a performance obligation so the uncertainty over the product may not have 
changed the likelihood or ability to invoke a legal remedy.  
161 See Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note x.  
162 Gilson, et al, Braiding, supra note x, at 1386 when the product or project is a work in progress. 
163 Id. at 1383. 
164 WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note x, at 57 (discussing “behavioral uncertainty” as “of 
special importance to an understanding of transaction cost economics.”) 
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transaction costs (frictions) while serving other needs such as centralization and 
planning.  
This Article will shed light on the reasons for that choice. Is the choice related 
to concerns that LTAs with information sharing protocols themselves pose risks 
or costs? What are those risks or costs? Scholars argue that the iterative sharing 
of information through information sharing protocols offers parties a way to 
determine what the ultimate product will be and, thus, overcomes one type of 
uncertainty: uncertainty about the ultimate product. In deciding why a particular 
arrangement is used, it is useful to consider other situations in the supply chain 
where the parties know what product they are supplying but face other key 
uncertainties of opportunism and shirking. When those uncertainties exist, can 
the parties achieve reductions in uncertainty from iterative steps without an LTA 
with formal information sharing protocols? Are there other ways to reduce 
uncertainties about reliability and competence that do not involve being in a 
close knit relational contract with preexisting trust? Can trust be endogenized by 
these iterative steps between parties, even if they forego using an LTA with a 
formal information mechanism, perhaps by being part of a network? Certainly, 
interim steps can be taken and the way the other party reacts can help to reduce 
uncertainty about the other party. Further, if the parties have access to a network, 
the parties could engage in tit-for-tat response to another party's action even 
when there is no long-term relationship.  
The information sharing devices in LTAs are particularly useful in 
heterogeneous supply chains where parties may lack a close relationship that 
would provide a source of information, facilitate informal enforcement and 
overcome uncertainties.165 Instead of trust already existing and forming the basis 
of a relationship (exogenously), the parties do not need to have “preexisting” 
trust with LTAs.166 The collaborative information sharing mechanisms allow 
them to “establish a deeply collaborative relation where none existed before.” 
167 It would be difficult to overcome the uncertainties by contract since 
provisions—promising to be a reliable supplier or to not shirk or one to promise 
to be excellent—would be too vague to enforce.168  
In the collaboration on a new product context, there is uncertainty about the 
ultimate product. Thus, contracting on the end product is impossible. Yet, to 
ensure that parties invest in a reciprocal way, they formally agree to make 
                                                            
165 Jennejohn, Innovation, supra note x, at 296. “These formal mechanisms combine to foster 
informal constraints that otherwise may not occur in dynamic heterogeneous markets in which 
much collaboration occurs in the modern economy.”  
166 Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note x, at 1377. 
167 Id. at 1404 
168 See WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note x, at 67 (suggesting such “general clause 
contracting” problematic where opportunism is present. 
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investments in either research or funding. 169 Parties may also agree to abide by 
rules requiring unanimity in committees.170 These mechanisms encourage 
cooperation, discourage misunderstandings171 and protect incentives to invest 
since “blatant” refusals to invest will be punished.172  
By increasing transparency, the LTAs can help to deter cheating and other forms 
of opportunism such as shirking, a different kind of uncertainty known as 
behavioral uncertainty. 173 LTAs help to overcome the problem of asymmetric 
information between the buyer and supplier by offering the supplier a way to 
signal its value to the buyer in the form of a credible commitment. LTAs build 
up social capital174 and personal ties175 that offer means of informal sanctioning 
for misbehaviors detected through the information sharing. Of course, as Oliver 
Williamson points out, “[g]iven the very real limitations, however, with which 
court ordering is beset”176  “contractual disputes are more often settled by private 
ordering.”177  
LTAs create a cost to both parties from exiting, called a “switching cost,”178 
thereby allowing parties to reap the advantages of mutual investment. This deters 
opportunism by both parties. Both parties engage in reciprocal investments. The 
condition of mutual investment, rather than any legal obligation, constrains 
opportunistic behavior by both parties, because they are locked into continuing 
their relationship since the switching costs of arranging for an alternative 
supplier are too great to justify an exit for a trivial deviation. Switching costs can 
occur even when the parties are not parties to LTAs with information sharing 
protocols. When a supplier furnishes goods to a buyer, switching costs can occur 
when the supplier has to find another buyer or the buyer has to find another 
                                                            
169 Cite needed. 
170 Gilson et al see two main advantages of these unanimity rules. First they will ensure parties 
get needed information. As the authors explain, a skeptic will be able to force disclosure because 
otherwise the other party will not get the consent it needs to proceed. It also “discourages 
obstinacy”. Gilson, et al., Braiding, supra note x, at 1403. This is because high level personnel to 
whom the dispute will be referred will not want their time wasted.  
171 “A referee can clarify misunderstandings early, avoiding false negatives-i.e., the interpretation 
of the other's behavior as a defection.When she finds that a defection has indeed occurred, a 
referee can, by "blowing the whistle" while providing for a fast and low-cost resolution to the 
dispute, forestall disproportionate responses by the aggrieved party. ... The referee alsoserves as 
an informal disciplining mechanism. . . . The subordinates' job is to resolve problems, not escalate 
them.” Gilson, et al., Innovation, supra note x, at 480-81. 
172 Gilson, et al., Braiding, supra note x, at 1409. 
173 WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note 25, at 57 (discussing behavioral uncertainty).  
174 Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 13, at 563. 
175 Id. at 35. 
176 WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note 25, at 21. 
177 Id. at 10.  
178 Gilson, et al., Innovation, supra note x, at 1383 (defining “switching costs-the costs one party 
to a contract must incur in order to replace the other party to the contract."). 
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supplier. Thus, switching costs in which a buyer has to research alternate 
suppliers can occur even without a formal LTA.  
Because many LTAs are legally unenforceable when they are signed (due to the 
absence of a quantity term),179 the agreements may be more important for the 
ways they facilitate interactions between the parties and reduce uncertainties 
about how good the products produced by the supplier will be or how 
competent180 one’s counterparty is. However, even if the agreements were 
legally enforceable, damage claims for breaches of the protocols would be 
difficult due to the contract doctrine requiring certainty in proving damages so 
reliance on informal enforcement would likely be predominant. 
Of course, the same uncertainties plague any supply chain for the sale of goods 
and not all parties exchanging goods resort to LTAs with information sharing 
protocols or unanimity rules. Why would that be the case? In cases where there 
is no guarantee of repeat business, the supplier has to work hard to earn the trust 
of the buyer who may not know him initially. The supplier needs to demonstrate 
his competence, commitment to quality and reliability, where those matters are 
unknown to the counterparty. Uncertainties about those matters can be lowered 
by iterative steps taken by the supplier. Even when there is certainty about the 
final product, the parties may still encounter uncertainty. Specifically, there is 
uncertainty regarding whether the goods will be quality goods and timely 
delivered and whether the supplier is reliable. Iterative responses during the 
supply contract can lower these uncertainties, even without any formal 
requirement in an LTA to share information.  
To assess why parties use forego using LTAs with formal informational sharing 
protocols, and opt to use another arrangement to govern supply chains instead, 
one must first assess the rationales offered for the formal informational 
protocols. Later, it might be useful to assess whether those rationales would also 
apply to non-LTAs.  
The formal information sharing and iterative collaboration result in reduced 
uncertainty about a party’s competence and reliability and in parties mutually 
investing.181 For example, typical in the pharmaceutical industry, a party 
(usually by the funding party) has a unilateral right to withdraw by the funding 
                                                            
179 Winn, supra note 64, at 20.  
180 Supply Chain Legal Reality: Why The UCC Is Sometimes The Worst, Part I (Or, Who Wrote 
This Thing Anyway) (Or, Traps For The Unwary) By Sarah Rathke on January 26, 2015 POSTED 
IN LEGAL ANALYSIS 
 
181 WHITFORD, supra note x, at 98-99.  
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party.182 So, while the parties do not yet know what will be produced, they are 
required to share information. That requirement incentivizes the research biotech 
industry to invest adequately in research since without adequate investment the 
funding party will withdraw. The information sharing mechanisms lend 
transparency to the investments and give confidence that the process is “fair”.183 
Sharing also leads to "iterative cooperative adjustments...."184  
The iterative steps are taken in the context of a contract that has nested options 
as well as provisions for how to handle disagreements. Due to “nested options 
regulating the sequence and conditions under which the parties can 
commercialize the product”185-- contractual options within an arrangement--the 
party that functions as the research entity will not take costly precautions to 
protect themselves. The research entity will not, for example, withhold 
information as their research yields more results, because they will be protected 
once they are able to produce a successful product from expropriation by the 
other party.186 The combination of a right to withdraw which encourages the 
researching party to invest sufficiently in research, the transparency, and nested 
options which give security as the project nears successful completion, and 
dispute resolution mechanisms increase accuracy in determining whether the 
parties have invested appropriately all constrain opportunism.187 These sharing 
protocols also deter “blatant” abuses of shared information.188 
In a supply chain where there is no major design collaboration and the product 
is a standard good, the major uncertainties will concern the other party’s 
reliability, shirking potential and competence. To reduce the uncertainties about 
the counterparty, the parties could but do not always require a transfer of 
information in a formal LTA. Instead, they may rely on other means of 
constraining opportunism. For example, the lock in effect189 which serves to 
deter parties from switching to another supplier or buyer when the party has 
performed, can occur even without the formally orchestrated exchange of 
information in an LTA. As parties deliver goods, make adjustments and 
demonstrate their competence and reliability, they reduce uncertainty about the 
competence and reliability of the counterparty leading to a lock in effect 
generated by the actions taken.  In these settings, and even when they are not in 
                                                            
182 Gilson et al., Innovation, supra note x, at 470. 
183 Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note x, at 1409. The information transmission is combined with 
governance mechanisms that may implement a contract referee for disputes. Since unanimity may 
be required for actions, parties can easily request information from the other party to secure their 
consent and “makes it reasonable for skeptics to require more information….” Id. at 1403.  
184 Id. at 1409. 
185 Id. at 1408. 
186 Id. at 1408.  
187 Gilson et al., Innovation, supra note x, at 491.  
188 Gilson, et. al, Braiding, supra note x, at 1384.  
189 Cite needed  
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a situation where repeated dealings are contemplated, parties may still be 
constrained if the information about their behavior will reach others in a network 
to which both firms belong. The very process of dealing with each other and 
gaining confidence in the other party about their ability to produce quality goods 
has similar benefits of constraining opportunism and locking in the parties 
without the need for formally shared information protocols.190.Thus, adoption of 
such protocols cannot be explained solely by the benefits of the lock in effect. 
Moreover, the lock in effect can also be achieved by a different contractual 
arrangement that locks both parties in with an upfront continuing commitment 
to purchase as was the case with German and Japanese economies.191 
Professor Lisa Bernstein suggests another answer as to why information sharing 
protocols exist. She explains that such arrangements “broaden the self-enforcing 
range of contractual obligations”192 and “expand[] the types of behavior that can 
be sanctioned.”193 Bernstein explains as follows: "For example, suppose that a 
supplier refused to permit a buyer's representative to conduct an unannounced 
factory inspection or audit that was authorized by the MSA."194 The "buyer 
would not have a credible threat to sue for damages;"195 however, the protocols 
offer the supplier a way of credibly committing to the buyer knowing that 
breaches of the audit protocol will lead to informal sanctions.196 Finally, 
Bernstein suggests that they “clear a space for other, extralegal modes of contract 
governance.”197 These information sharing protocols also secure a higher price 
                                                            
190 If a supplier terminated its relationship with a buyer, it would have to explain to future buyers 
why it did so. Since future buyers would be wary of suppliers who terminate relationships, 
suppliers would be hesitate to exit, leading to a lock in effect. A similar, parallel effect could 
constrain buyers.  
191 For a discussion of a different governance mechanism that produces a lock in effect in a 
different way than the information sharing protocols do. Instead of gradually raising switching 
costs through increased trust and confidence, the Japanese and German companies “first raise 
switching costs—in effect prohibiting exit from the relationship—and then devising ways of 
sharing information to work productively within the constraints they have imposed.” Gilson, et. 
al, Innovation, supra note x, at 1411.  
192 Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 13, at 563.  
193 Id.  
194 Id. at 603. 
195 Id. at 603. 
196 For a discussion of credible commitments as a private device parties use to lower uncertainties 
about the other party, see WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note 25, at 167. Credible 
commitments are “tactics by which one party can realize an advantage in relation to a rival by 
credibly ‘tying one’s hands.’” In the context of the supply chain, suppliers subscribing to abide 
by information sharing mechanisms are in effect offering a type of hostage or bond that 
distinguishes those willing to share such information from those suppliers who refuse to do so.  
197 Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 13, at 562. 
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for the supplier than could otherwise be obtained or secure a contract that it could 
not otherwise obtain.198 
If iterative steps can be taken to lower uncertainties about shirking and reliability 
or if a supplier can resolve those uncertainties simply by agreeing to a buyer’s 
terms and conditions not to sell any product that does not conform to a buyer’s 
quality manual,199 then why would some relationships benefit from the 
additional formal provisions mandating information sharing? Why and when 
would those additional formal provisions be worth the cost, or would there be 
offsetting benefits that would outweigh the costs of negotiation?200 There will 
always be space for informal governance even without the formal information 
sharing protocols.  The real question is therefore whether the benefits in lowering 
uncertainties and building trust where there is no preexisting trust outweigh the 
other costs of negotiating an LTA and the potential costs of opportunistic 
exploitation of the information. The answer to that question will vary with 
different contexts.  
To understand why some parties use LTAs while others do not, consider several 
cases. Consider also the bargaining lens with its focus on the parties’ individual 
interests and their desire to minimize transaction costs to maximize surplus. One 
case involves the supply chain in the automotive context, another setting 
involves a manufacturer of a standard product that is fungible, and another 
involves the highly collaborative project on research. In the automotive context, 
there are likely to be large asset specific sunk costs. Such large sunk costs are 
also likely to be present in the collaborative research context. Such sunk costs 
would be less likely to be the case where there is a fungible good. Differences in 
the degree of sunk costs and asset specific investments may explain the 
differential use of LTAs.201 The need to protect those sunk costs may explain the 
                                                            
198 Since credible commitments act as a kind of safeguard “to restore integrity to transactions.” 
WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note 25, at 20. Since transactions with safeguards are acting to 
minimize hazards, they will be priced accordingly. Id. at 24  
199 See John Deere Terms and Conditions  
200 The different approach to lock in where the lock in effect is achieved by a contract that 
obligates the company to continue purchasing has several notable disadvantages including 
increased shirking and a lessened ability to deal with disruptions and challenges. These 
disadvantages suggest reasons for why the incremental building of a lock in effect over time has 
advantages over the lock in effect achieved by long-term commitments. See Gilson et al., 
Braiding, supra note x, at 1414.  
201 Interview 2/22. 20 of the 68 companies surveyed indicated that they acquired capital equipment 
for a specific buyer in at least 67 percent of their dealings. Of these companies 32 percent indicated 
that they use LTAs and MSAs at least 76 percent of the time. All of the companies indicated that they 
use LTAs or MSAs at least 11 percent of the time. Although the sample size is small, survey results 
tend to indicate that manufacturers who incur significant costs to purchase capital equipment are more 
likely than the average manufacturer to use an LTA. 
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willingness to take on the additional costs of an LTA even with the onerous terms 
that are often contained in such agreements. Where large sunk costs are not 
present, and the goods can be resold to others, the need for an LTA may be 
reduced, especially if other means of assuring reliability.  
Additionally, where one party’s production is dependent on the other party’s 
production, information sharing protocols may be important in preventing 
problems early before they adversely impact production by the buyer. The 
information sharing protocols would then provide added benefits that would 
outweigh the costs. In addition, when there are large asymmetric sunk cost 
investments, the presence of information sharing protocols may lessen 
                                                            
 
Manufacturers with LTA/MSA Usage 
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Costs 
All 
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0% - 10% 0 21 
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26% - 75% 7 18 
76% - 100% 6 11 
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 201 See the Donnelly/Honda example from Sue Helper.  
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uncertainties and encourage investment which might not otherwise occur if there 
were no formal sharing of information to demonstrate a willingness to 
collaborate and invest by the other party.  
2. Lowering Costs: Lowering the Cost from Shirking by Permitting Self-
Help  
The information provisions lower the costs from supplier shirking. Because 
LTAs are structured to permit buyers to exercise a great deal of self-help, they 
promote self-enforcement of matters involving the quality of goods.202 First, if 
the goods do not meet the standards of the buyer, the buyer can insist that the 
supplier send new goods meeting those standards and supplier may need to 
assume expedited shipping costs.203  Instead of rejecting goods that are 
substandard204 and then suing the supplier, buyers are often not obligated to buy 
goods that do not meet their standards.205 That helps lower the costs that the 
buyer must shoulder for substandard goods. Suppliers agreeing to such clauses 
may signal their commitment to sending high quality products.  
Of course, even without an LTA specifically conditioning the buyer’s obligation 
to buy on the supplier meeting certain quality standards and facilitating self-help 
through the LTA, the parties often exercise self-help. If a buyer complains about 
a product, the supplier might simply take the product back and rarely would 
anyone sue over a performance obligation. So, self-help can occur without 
information sharing protocols or LTA provisions on self-help being present.  
The bargaining lens may help explain why a buyer and a seller’s joint interest in 
minimizing transaction costs and maximizing value might be served by an LTA 
self-help provision. The provision helps the buyer avoid the cost of legal 
enforcement over substandard goods and insuring that it is only obligated to pay 
for conforming goods. The supplier’s self-interest is in signaling that it is a high 
quality supplier. Whether the buyer agrees to that kind of term in an LTA will 
depend on whether there are other benefits from agreeing to the LTA such as 
cementing a relationship with a buyer or securing a long term commitment that 
is either legally enforceable or comes with an implicit expectation of other 
benefits from the buyer should the buyer terminate its purchases early.206 
                                                            
202 Winn, supra note 64, at 5. See also Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 13, at 
607 (discussing the connection between self-enforcement and network governance). 
203 See Sun Master Supply Agreement  
204 UCC rejection provisions. 2-601.  
205 See e.g. Whirlpool Strategic Alliance Agreement Section 6.3  
206 See the Donnelly/Honda example from Sue Helper.  
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3. Overcoming Asymmetric Information: Credible Commitment  
LTAs also act as a way for suppliers to offer a credible commitment to their 
potential buyers.207  Buyers who might be reluctant to do business with a supplier 
(because of uncertainties about their competence or reliability) will agree to do 
business with suppliers who sign LTAs. In this situation, the buyer will have 
more information about the supplier before the contract is signed, which helps 
to solve a problem of asymmetric information. Suppliers may agree to prequalify 
to even be eligible to be a supplier. Some suppliers may agree to participate in 
webinar training or achieving excellence programs.208 Going forward suppliers 
may disclose more information on a continuing basis.209 The supplier may agree 
to give the buyer access to the supplier’s plant, perhaps with the provision of a 
quality engineer on the premises.210 Suppliers agree to give buyers access to cost 
information and audits. Because suppliers have to furnish quality control reports, 
participate in quality training programs,211 provide cost information, and agree 
to participate in mandates for root cause analysis212 for problem detection,213 the 
buyer learns about the supplier’s competence and reliability. As a result, this 
lowers the uncertainty about the counterparty as the parties exchange goods with 
each other.  
Suppliers agree to participate in part because by lowering uncertainty for the 
buyer and signaling its willingness to share information the supplier earns a 
higher price for its goods. In a sense, the supplier’s agreement to engage in 
information sharing constitutes a credible commitment,214 which increases the 
price the buyers will pay. Presumably, without such information agreements, the 
                                                            
207 See supra note 196 (discussing credible commitments).  
208 See John Deere program discussed in Gilson et al., Innovation, supra note x, at 459-63; 
Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note x, at 581-83. See Deere & Company and 
Stanadyne Corp. 2001 Long Term Supply Agreement between Deere and Stanadyne Corp. 
www.sec.go/Archives/edgar/data/1053439/00011931250718244 
209 Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note x, at 583 (discussing continuing 
obligations to supply information through plant inspections and financial audits).  
210  
211 John Deere requires participation in training by its suppliers in their LTAs. Suppliers may also 
agree that if their products are below specified metrics, the buyer is not obligated to buy.  
212 “A root cause analysis is a ‘tool designed to help identify not only what and how an event 
occurred but also why it happened.” Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 13, at 
584, citing James J. Rooney and Lee N. Vanden Heuvel Root Cause Analysis for Beginners, 37 
QUALITY PROGRESS 45 (2004). See also  
213 Helper et al, supra note 19.  
214 “It is this information sharing regime that braids the formal and informal elements of the 
contract and endogenizes trust.” Gilson et al, Braiding, supra note 3, at 1438. 
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buyer might pay less because more uncertainties about the supplier would 
remain unresolved.215  
Even without an LTA with a formal information sharing device, the supplier 
might undertake to signal its reliability and competence in other ways. It could 
pre-qualify as a supplier216 and meet the specifications of the buyer before 
bidding. It could warrant its compliance with a quality manual in the purchase 
order. Suppliers could agree to terms and conditions which give the Buyer a 
termination for convenience clause, agreement to which would signal the 
supplier’s confidence in the quality of its goods.217 Under the bargaining len 
modeled here, suppliers will weigh the increased prices paid for credible 
commitments in the form of information sharing against possible costs such as 
buyer expropriation of shared information.  
4. Other Benefits of LTAs: Improved Methods of Production 
In this process of continuous improvement, the LTA may provide for the pooling 
of information. This shared information leads to parties becoming increasingly 
nimble at adopting new methods.218 The sharing of information reduces concerns 
about remaining ignorant of the other and the greater transparency may lessen 
what one author terms “incitements to trickery.”219 The sharing of information 
by the supplier also may be useful in benchmarking and error detection 
techniques that permit the parties to collaborate on improvements in 
efficiencies.220 Information sharing also exposes the supplier to the culture of the 
                                                            
215 See WILLIAMSON, INSTITUTIONS, supra note 25, at 174 (discussing the value of credible 
commitments in reducing a hazard of an exchange and thereby increasing the efficiency of the 
exchange). 
216 Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 13, at 597. 
217  Joseph Martini, Matthew Brown, Susan Kennedy, Termination for Convenience under the 
Uniform Commercial Code, APA Commercial Law Newsletter, Spring 2014, at 3–5. 
218 “Relational capital increases flexibility, enables the parties to rely on reciprocal informal 
adjustments being made over time, and leads to the sharing of information that can greatly reduce 
production costs.” Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 13, at 597. 
219 See Helper, et al., Pragmatics, supra note 19, at 471.  
220 As Professor Helper explains: “the exchanges of information required to engage in 
benchmarking,simultaneous engineering and error detection and correction also allow the 
collaborators to monitor one another’s activities, closely enough to detect performance failures 
and deception before they lead to disastrous consequences.” Id. at 466.  “As Boeing outsourced 
more, communication and coordination between Boeing and its suppliers became critical for 
managing the progress of the 787 development program. To facilitate the coordination and 
collaboration among suppliers and Boeing, Boeing implemented a web-based tool called Exostar 
that is intended to gain supply chain visibility, improve control and integration of critical business 
processes, and reduce development time and cost Manufacturing Business Technology, 2007).” 
Tang, supra note 84, at 78.  
 
 
44 | Page 
 
buyer, and that understanding gives the supplier an edge in becoming a better 
supplier.  
5. Personal Ties Enhanced. Cost Reductions Originated  
The LTA may also provide for personnel meetings, visits to the supplier’s plant 
or visits by supplier engineers to the buyer.221 The buyer could mandate a quality 
engineer to inspect the supplier’s plant. All of these formalized interactions 
facilitate trust and information sharing, in part through the development of 
personal ties.222 The supplier may also agree to or be pressured to accept targeted 
price reductions of a certain percentage each year. One author suggests that 
“simple sharing rules may result”223 and under such rules the parties could agree 
on how to share the “gains from innovations.”224  
As with other benefits generated by LTA provisions that require or encourage 
visits to the supplier or buyer plants, the question is whether such ties could 
occur without being formally orchestrated. Presumably, such contacts could 
occur without being formally required. These personal connections could occur 
because the parties are embedded in a network. Embeddedness can take “four 
forms: structural, cognitive, political and cultural.”225 Parties constantly 
communicate information that results in numerous benefits including greater 
trust in veracity of the information shared.226 In other cases, the parties can be 
autonomous firms without formal information sharing protocols but personal ties 
can develop as the relationship continues. In other cases, the parties may not 
share close personal ties but may share ties to a network of buyers and suppliers 
that share information, making personal ties unimportant. The incentive to 
formally require inspections on an ongoing basis with the resulting closer 
personal ties might be more likely when the buyer’s investment is dependent on 
the success of the supplier. As the buyer invests more in the joint project, it has 
more to lose if the supplier cannot produce quality parts or fuselages in a timely 
fashion. Thus, as the parties are locked into a bilateral relationship of mutual 
dependency, the willingness and need to adopt provisions to control hazards is 
greater.  
                                                            
221 Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 13, at 593. 
222 Id. at 592–4. 
223 Susan Helper, et al., Pragmatics, supra note 19, at, 472-743 (2000).  
224 Id. 
225 Brian Uzzi, Social Structure and Competition in Interfirm Networks: the Paradox of 
Embeddedness, 42 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 35 (1997). 
226 Id. at 46. 
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6. Preventing Problems From Arising; Switching Costs Deterring 
Opportunism 
These mechanisms achieve major benefits. They help prevent problems from 
arising.227 Although the provisions may be largely unenforceable, since it is hard 
to envision how the buyer could sue for damages for failure to share information, 
they will help the buyer identify problems early on and ensure that the buyer has 
a continuous flow of information that will help it improve its products and 
remain competitive.228 The protocols alert the supplier to the kinds of 
information it needs to make available to its buyers and sets up expectations for 
the personnel at the supplier. The “braiding” that results from the multiple 
interactions may help to deter opportunism by both buyer and supplier. The 
supplier would be deterred from shirking or shading because if it did, and it lost 
the supply contract, it would have to explain to a new buyer why it exited a prior 
LTA. Similarly, if the buyer needed to find a new supplier, it would have to 
explain to the new supplier why it had terminated a prior supplier. It would have 
to assure the new supplier that it had not acted opportunistically or it might have 
difficulty getting the new supplier to collaborate on a project.  
Although few formal provisions burden buyers,229 once the parties have 
solidified a relationship with each other that may include information sharing, 
visits to the supplier’s plant, and even training seminars to be held at the buyer’s 
facilities, there are informal forces that will keep buyers from going to another 
supplier. Thus, the benefits of this arrangement arise from a constraint of 
switching cost, rather than a legal cost of breaching a term of the LTA. 
Can these switching costs occur without formal information transfer 
mechanisms? There are many ways to create switching costs without an LTA. 
For example, a supplier could raise switching costs for a buyer by making a 
unique part for a buyer. Similarly, if a supplier develops a fuel pump for an 
airplane engine and the fuel pump is approved by the FAA for the life of the 
airplane,230 then that buyer will have infinite switching costs as the FAA would 
have to approve a new fuel pump. Changing to a new fuel pump would not be 
possible without violating the airplane manufacturer’s agreement with the FAA 
to install only pre-approved parts. Switching costs can occur in any relationship 
as a party provides the other party information about its reliability and 
competence through its performance. Gilson, Sabel and Scott  explain this 
                                                            
227 See Winn, supra note 64, at 19. 
228 Winn, supra note 64. 
229 As Bernstein notes, “Buyers have few information disclosure obligations apart from a duty to 
provide non-binding rolling forecasts on a monthly or quarterly basis.” Bernstein, Beyond 
Relational Contracts, supra note 13, at 593. 
230 The FAA has to approve the initial fuel pump and would have to approve any replacement fuel 
pumps. See Interview 
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phenomenon as one that occurs “in markets where learning about the quality of 
potential substitute suppliers and their products is time consuming and 
expensive, there can be significant barriers—switching costs—to exiting a 
relationship.”231 Presumably, even without entering in an LTA with formal 
information protocols, the knowledge gained about the counterparty’s abilities 
and reliability will act as a deterrent to exit. If a buyer complains about a product, 
and the supplier offers a concession in price without even requiring that the 
defective products be returned, both parties are learning about the other, even if 
there is no required disclosure of information. When a supplier offers a 
concession on the invoice for defective products the customer complained about 
without even looking at the parts, it demonstrates that it is trustworthy and 
standing behind the quality of its products. At the same time, the reasonableness 
of the buyer’s complaint will signal to the supplier how trustworthy the buyer is. 
Is the buyer trumping up complaints or registering reasonable objections? Or is 
there a miscommunication of expectation between the parties that can be 
corrected? This “joint effort” that occurs as parties interact with one another can 
occur even without the formal information provisions in an LTA. The degree of 
investment and performance might be greater when parties are involved in a 
collaboration, but the same learning through observing a party’s interative, 
incremental performance can occur even when parties operate purchase order by 
purchase order.  
7. New Forms of Misbehavior Identified232 
LTAs, with their frameworks for information sharing, personnel exchanges, 
mechanisms for detecting and correcting error, and encouraging training to meet 
buyer standards may foster the building of social capital and trust and encourage 
collaboration to develop innovative products. LTAs may facilitate informal 
enforcement in another way. By detailing lots of ways in which suppliers are 
expected to cooperate, buyers have new categories of misbehavior which 
“broadens the types of behavior that can be sanctioned through reputational harm 
or rewarded.” 233 And these categories of cooperation or misbehavior do not 
require judicial verification. 234 
Of course, if the LTA laid out an information sharing mechanism that specified 
“the types of behavior that can be sanctioned through reputational harm,”235 then 
the LTA would be broadening the basis for imposing sanctions. But an LTA with 
a provision outlawing certain behaviors would not need to exist in order for a 
buyer to sanction a counterparty informally. For example, a buyer may be 
dissatisfied with the performance of the supplier because the supplier was not 
particularly cooperative or willing to make adjustments, even though the 
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supplier may have technically met the requirements of the contract. Here, the 
buyer could and would downgrade the supplier in future dealings even without 
any LTA provision that required or ranked the supplier on cooperativeness. So, 
the question remains whether the LTA provisions actually “broaden the self-
enforcing range of contractual obligations”236 or whether they are the exclusive 
means of broadening the basis of sanctions.  
B. Positive Benefits of LTAs: Planning Benefits and Centralization  
In some cases there are reasons to enter into LTAs that originate not from an 
attempt to control contractual hazards but to achieve two other benefits.  
One benefit from having a formal LTA is a planning benefit. It lays out the 
obligations of the parties in a systematic way. There is a benefit to parties in 
doing that “as a way of minimizing misunderstandings about what current 
thinking is about the future.”237 Writing allows parties to “identify 
incompleteness in our thought processes, and even analytical errors.”238 Written 
agreements to govern long term relationships are not new but outlining the 
planning benefits is important in terms of the bargaining lens. How much weight 
do the parties place on a written agreement that takes the form of an LTA? Does 
LTA as a written document for planning play more of a role in the innovation 
context where parties must engage in a complex process of research and 
funding? The Hadfield/Brozovic article suggests that the planning aspect in 
innovation contexts is a very important function. Parties routinely resort to 
consulting the LTA when questions arise during the course of the relationship 
and thereby depart from the usual practice of rarely consulting contracts in a sale 
of goods context. 
A second positive benefit of an LTA that takes the form of an SFK is to 
“centralize decisionmaking.”239 Rather than allowing individual managers to 
negotiate individual contracts, the implementation of the LTA is centralized with 
unified control of what the terms look like. In the context of OEMs and suppliers, 
where OEMs depend on many suppliers for inventory items, the LTA SFK offers 
another advantage. Buyers have to be able to assure suppliers that they are 
offering standard terms to all suppliers and thus offering parity and the LTA 
offers that benefit.  
V. Diversified Strategies 
Some initial empirical research indicates that despite all the advantages that 
formal information sharing protocols achieve, parties do not adopt one uniform 
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approach to solving problems in supply chains and in collaborating; the LTA is 
one mechanism, but parties may deliberately opt for other ways of exchanging 
goods. Their choices may depend on a number of factors including the 
transaction costs of negotiating an LTA, and whether the LTA is needed to 
protect large sunk costs or capital equipment specially manufactured for a buyer. 
Other arrangements which parties enter into to protect their capital investments 
include 1. LTAs with a quantity term, 2. operating purchase order by purchase 
order, 3. acting as a contract manufacturer and limiting liability by executing a 
blueprint without any deviation, and 4. entering into joint development projects 
that protect capital investments exclusively by IP and licensing mechanisms.  
In thinking about why parties might adopt LTAs to govern their relationship, it 
is important to note that parties exchanging goods, and even developing new 
products, have a variety of ways to structure their arrangements. Key benefits of 
some LTAs derive from the transfer of information, which, in turn, facilitates 
informal governance and constrains opportunism in the face of uncertainty about 
competence, shading, reliability, etc. But, parties may devise other ways of 
operating beyond the LTA without the information sharing protocols (braiding 
mechanisms) discussed earlier. And they will find ways even without an LTA to 
engage in informal governance to achieve the quality goals without resorting to 
a lawsuit. As Matthew Jennejohn explains, there is a “rich diversity of 
governance strategies observed in the design of many alliance contracts.”240  
This Article explores some of the alternatives below.  
A. LTA with a Quantity Term 
Some parties may insist on an LTA that contains a quantity that would make it 
legally enforceable ex ante.241 This is different than the prototypical LTA studied 
by scholars, because it contains a quantity requirement and is immediately 
enforceable. A supplier may insist on an LTA that contains a provision that 
prevents the buyer from cancelling without paying for work in the pipeline or if 
there are large capital equipment or tooling costs, may want an exit termination 
fee or a minimum quantity requirement. In some settings, the parties’ willingness 
to enter into an LTA without firm purchase obligations and the reliance on the 
reciprocal investments in learning and monitoring by both parties may not work 
to deter potential opportunism. This is especially likely to be the case when 
[there is not a long-term arrangement between the parties and] there are large 
capital equipment costs that must be incurred by the supplier. When these 
informal forces are unlikely to work because of the lack of ongoing relations, or 
when a market dominant player is involved, the supplier’s threat to impose 
reputational sanctions on a buyer (an original equipment manufacturer) such as 
Boeing may not work. Then, a term in a legally enforceable LTA that prevents 
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the buyer from cancelling without paying an exit termination fee or a minimum 
quantity term may be important to a supplier. Some smaller manufacturers may 
insist on such a provision before entering into an LTA with a buyer and they will 
not sign an LTA without a quantity term, thereby ensuring its enforceability. In 
that case, the kinds of provisions of information sharing that promote trust in the 
other party and reduce uncertainty through a learning by monitoring process in 
the LTA may not be as important, because the supplier is largely responsible for 
making a fungible commodity and the learning by monitoring is not as 
important. But it may be critical to have an enforceable contract that can offer 
protection against opportunism if things go awry due to the large investment in 
capital equipment.  
If the volume is in the thousands or millions, supplier firms may be unwilling to 
do business without an LTA, but there are other instances in which parties forego 
an LTA. For suppliers manufacturing a one off (unique) piece of equipment 
when there are no continuing purchases, having an LTA or some other contract 
such as a purchase order that is legally enforceable and that covers the capital 
equipment will be the key issue.242 For a one-time 3D printing order, a firm may 
forego an LTA.243 The only risk is that the supplier will not get paid for that item. 
In that instance, the transaction costs of negotiating an LTA are not warranted.  
The decision about whether to enter an LTA with a quantity term may depend 
on the potential for a lost sunk cost if the contract is not enforceable. However, 
if the LTA is crafted by a large OEM, it may be drafted in a very pro-buyer 
fashion, with mandated cost reductions imposed on the supplier. The supplier 
will need to decide on whether the LTA offers enough value in terms of 
constraining opportunism by both the buyer and seller through switching costs 
that will offset some of the disadvantages of a continuing cost reduction 
percentage imposed on an annual basis by a buyer and the transaction costs of 
negotiating one.  
B. Purchase Order by Purchase Order 
Of course, there are alternative ways of doing business contractually outside an 
LTA. A supplier can deliberately choose to operate purchase order by purchase 
order, even with large OEMs.244With the purchase order by purchase order (PO 
by PO) means of doing business, the supplier can attempt to introduce terms that 
are favorable to it and may insist on terms that deal with warranty, damages 
(particularly damages caps), insurance and indemnity, and disclaimers of 
liability. Those provisions may be critical for suppliers whose products are going 
to be used by buyers who will suffer large consequential damages if a part 
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malfunctions and a factory is shut down or a catastrophic liability if a 
malfunctioning part causes an airplane to crash and parties to be injured.   
Suppliers who operate PO by PO may use informal mechanisms of adjustment 
that are extra-contractual, but in some instances the contractual provisions will 
be very important. Regardless of whether the supplier is signing an LTA or 
operating on a PO by PO basis, the supplier may insist on getting limits on 
damages and eliminating consequential damages.  
The willingness to enter LTAs without a firm quantity requirement but with 
elaborate information sharing requirements or to enter an LTA with a firm 
quantity requirement may shift when asymmetric investments or large sunk costs 
are absent. In such cases suppliers may be less willing to undertake the 
negotiation costs of entering into an LTA or MSA. Instead, the supplier may opt 
to operate with a quote, that is, a purchase order and acknowledgement. This is 
particularly likely to be true when the supplier produces most of its products 
from a catalog and the buyers buy from the catalog. The supplier could sell its 
catalog products to others. In such cases, the supplier may insert terms that favor 
itself in its acknowledgement order that it hopes will govern the transaction 
should there be a dispute. It can control the content of the contract by rejecting 
terms that are in the buyer’s purchase order and are harmful.  
In cases where the sunk costs are low because the supplier is making a fungible 
item or where the co-design is very limited, the costs of the LTA may outweigh 
the benefits particularly when the LTA may contain negative provisions like 
mandatory cost reductions on an annual basis. The big threat that the supplier 
faces is that of the buyer reneging after the supplier invests in large and 
expensive capital equipment. When that is not present, the risks for the supplier 
are lower.  
In addition, there is always the risk that a buyer will falsely claim that the goods 
produced by the supplier are substandard or defective. But those risks can be 
managed by adjustments between the parties. The supplier can offer to replace 
defective products and pay for the cost of shipping in order to keep the buyer 
happy. Then as the relationship goes on the switching costs become real and that 
acts as a deterrent to the buyer falsely claiming defective products.  
But even if the parties will often rely on informal adjustments, there will be 
provisions that a supplier operating on a purchase order by purchase order basis 
may insist on in the event that there is a lawsuit. One supplier has indicated that 
the most important provisions concern warranty, liability, damage caps, IP, 
insurance, and indemnity. These provisions are likely to be important when 
informal ways of solving problems have broken down and a lawsuit has been 
initiated. The lawsuit may be initiated by a third party who is suing the buyer for 
an airplane that blew up or a medical device that malfunctioned that contained a 
part manufactured by a supplier. In these kinds of circumstances, the liability 
caps and consequential damages provisions may be key. 
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C. Contract Manufacturer  
Another alternative means of managing the exchange of goods occurs when the 
supplier chooses to protect itself by limiting its role to that of a contract 
manufacturer. It may take the blueprints of a medical supply company but refuse 
to put its insignia on the print or to deviate from the buyer’s print in order to 
limit its own liability. The liability exposure with medical devices is huge and 
the supplier who coordinates on production of such a device may obtain 
protection by becoming the implementer of a drawing made by someone else. 
They may operate without an LTA in such cases. The absence of a stream of 
future orders would mean that the transaction costs of an LTA might not be 
worth it.  
Finally, the supplier may coordinate with another party on the joint development 
of a product. But, instead of using an LTA, the supplier may instead protect itself 
and its investment through an intellectual property and licensing agreement with 
the other party.   
In other cases, where the goods are not customizable and are out of a catalog, 
the parties may not use or need a network that results in an LTA and the absence 
of such a network may be optimal and efficient. “Ideal typical networks 
presuppose an organizational field characterized by a combination of unstable 
demand and either rapidly changing knowledge or complex interdependencies 
and (2) the embedding of economic activity in social institutions that 
simultaneously engender a continuous search for new information and 
safeguards against opportunism.” 245. When there are not “complex 
interdependencies,” the investment in the sharing protocols of information may 
not be worth the transaction costs of negotiating the agreement.  
D. Customizable Goods IP and Licensing Contracts  
Even when the supplier does have large sunk costs and undertakes to create a 
customizable product with another partner, it may decide that it will protect itself 
against opportunism only with Intellectual Property protections in a contract and 
may forego using an LTA. In the case of a jointly developed product, it may be 
impossible to describe the product for purposes of a purchase order and the time 
horizon may be limited; the joint product development will end with the product 
being successfully created. By negotiating IP ownership rights, the supplier can 
protect its sunk costs and therefore does not need to enter into an LTA. It may 
not be able to describe the item with sufficient definiteness for either a purchase 
order or an LTA, but it can negotiate the ownership of the IP from the product 
that is jointly created. The question for further research is what are the 
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characteristics of a transaction that will incline a supplier to use IP for joint 
product development rather than an LTA. What can we learn from that choice? 
Conclusion: Diversified Strategies 
This Article suggests that because not all parties adopt the formal information 
sharing arrangements in an LTA, opting to operate purchase order by purchase 
order instead, the choice must be explained by some additional costs posed by 
these formal information sharing arrangements and the overall costs of an LTA. 
This Article suggests that the costs of such formal information sharing protocols 
and of entering an LTA might outweigh the benefits particularly where a long-
term relationship reduces uncertainty about competence and trustworthiness, 
leads to a lock in effect and constrains opportunism, making the information 
sharing protocols unnecessary. Moreover, if the parties are part of a network of 
suppliers and buyers, they may be able to acquire information about the behavior 
of parties even without formal information sharing protocols. Moreover, where 
the supplier can easily resell to others, because the part is a catalog part not 
requiring large sunk costs, the need to secure a long-term commitment to recoup 
those sunk costs would be absent making the benefit of an LTA including one 
with information sharing protocols less beneficial particularly when such 
agreements often contain terms onerous to the supplier. In such cases, an LTA 
with sharing protocols may not be needed. Finally, parties may avoid such 
agreements because the very sharing protocols that facilitate informal 
enforcement by the buyer also can be subject to abuse by the buyer who 
appropriates shared information and gives it to a competitor of the supplier.  
If the buyer today is dissatisfied with quality, it may refuse to buy but since the 
provision on quality is tied to the buyer’s own metrics of excellence, a supplier 
would have difficulty suing a buyer for refusing to take its products.246 The resort 
would be to self-help rather than the judicial system. The supplier would be 
incentivized to meet quality or risk a loss of the future business. 
The decision to operate purchase order by purchase order or by an LTA or as a 
contract manufacturer or as the potential owner of the intellectual property from 
a jointly created product seems to be deliberate. In some cases, a supplier will 
have to sign an LTA or risk losing the business of an OEM. In these cases, a 
supplier may not choose to enter an LTA voluntarily and may be unhappy with 
the terms of the LTA. In other cases, the supplier will resist signing an LTA, 
calculating that another method of exchanging goods may be optimal.  
Choosing a purchase order as the means of doing business may make sense 
where the product is fungible. There, the costs of an LTA do not seem worth it. 
The supplier may be less worried about having the security of an LTA where it 
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can sell its catalog product to others. In addition, the long history with a buyer 
may obviate the need for an LTA since the trust generated from prior dealings 
may give both parties confidence that any matters requiring adjustment can be 
worked out informally. 
Moreover, even without the benefit of an LTA, the supplier can exercise the 
kinds of informal reputational sanctions against a buyer who reneges and a buyer 
similarly can threaten to cut off future dealings with suppliers who furnish 
substandard goods even without resorting to legal remedies against the supplier. 
The ability to exercise such informal sanctioning is enhanced by being part of a 
network of suppliers and buyers.  
The advantage of the LTA is that it has established mechanisms for sharing 
information. These mostly obligate the supplier to furnish information to the 
buyer including financial statements, to allow access to the supplier’s plant, to 
participate in supplier training programs, and to furnish information about the 
supplier’s costs. The constant exchange of this information gives the buyer 
confidence about the supplier’s competence and reliability. When the goods are 
non-fungible, and the buyer depends on the products being up to buyer standards, 
these devices sharing information give the buyer a way to detect problems before 
they arise. They also eliminate errors due to supplier’s misunderstandings about 
the buyer’s requirements.247 Where the contracts are long-term and the buyer is 
depending on just-in-time production and low inventories248, the buyer cannot 
afford to sue suppliers who renege so these sharing protocols have value. 
Suppliers may choose to participate because they have no choice or because in 
doing so, and, in doing so, they furnish a credible commitment to the buyer of 
their worth and quality.  
Professor Jennejohn has recently suggested that the presence of a veto power, 
another type of governance sometimes present in an LTA, is inconsistent with 
the braiding theorists since “the allocation of a veto would allow a party to 
unilaterally undercut the mutual investment in relationship-specific information 
that plays an important part in the braiding model.”249 However, these veto 
provisions often concern ownership rights. In assessing governance 
mechanisms, of whatever type, the question is what provision will best achieve 
the parties’ goals at the lowest cost. By giving a party a veto right, that is 
equivalent to a right to exclude,250 the party with a property interest can insure 
that that interest is protected. The presence of a veto right or unanimity insures 
that there is a clear rule as to who owned the foreground IP so that the matter of 
the new property that was the product of the collaboration could be properly 
recognized and the proceeds shared. Where a property right is at stake, the 
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problem is one that may not be solved by information sharing or informal 
enforcement that are effective tools in insuring the quality of goods. The matter 
of foreground IP rights should be established by a clear rule. It is hard to see how 
informal enforcement would be a means of enforcing a foreground IP right. 
Without the protection of a right to exclude, the incentive to collaborate on an 
innovative product would diminish. Professor Jennejohn sees the veto right as 
one that responds to a contractual hazard not previously addressed by the 
contract innovation theories. He identifies a spillover as a risk not previously 
recognized. He would therefore portray contracts as subject to multiple exchange 
hazards that may require different types of responses necessitating “a 
governance mechanism” or mechanisms that can mitigate those “multivalent” 
hazards.251  
In this Section, I have identified different types of arrangements for the sale of 
goods that parties may use to illustrate the idea that parties will choose the most 
cost-effective means of controlling contractual hazards. Unlike Professor 
Jennejohn, I do not see spillover as a risk that is fundamentally different from 
opportunism. Essentially, one party is worried that its property will be taken or 
exploited by the other party. However, I agree with Jennejohn that the choice of 
a controlling mechanism will be determined by the particular hazard that is faced 
and the cost of the controlling mechanism.  
Presumably, parties will organize their exchanges to minimize transaction costs 
and frictions to increase the surplus generated. In evaluating whether the parties 
will adopt an LTA that is legally unenforceable, an LTA that is enforceable ex 
ante, or another strategy will depend on the fundamental question of whether the 
benefits of adopting the mechanism exceed the costs, given certain assumptions 
about human behavior. The Nobel economist Oliver Williamson argues that 
parties will choose their governance mechanisms in a way that will “attenuate 
opportunism” and thus create value for the exchange and increase surplus. A 
failure to remedy such opportunism will cost parties contractual surplus and thus 
they will use strategies to reduce that cost. 
VI. Informal Reputational Sanctions without an LTA 
The success of these alternatives to LTAs may depend on understanding that 
many of the parties will have a variety of strategies for dealing with uncertainties 
about the competence and reliability (another term for opportunism) of their 
counterparty. Some are contractual and some are informal mechanisms. They 
can operate in tandem and be complements.  The LTA may be one means of 
solving problems when there are significant problems of uncertainty and 
opportunism. It may be a contract but also a form of economic governance that 
goes beyond the parties’ formal obligations. Some LTAs, by the way they 
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promote information transfer, collaboration, transparency and trust in a learning 
by monitoring system facilitate a private extra-legal governance structure that is 
as important as the legal enforcement of the parties’ obligations. Of course, 
informal enforcement can occur even without an LTA. 
Even if there is no LTA, of course, the opportunism that operates as an 
omnipresent threat to exchange relations could be managed informally by threats 
to no longer do business or damage the other party’s reputation in the industry. 
Thus, even without an LTA, informal sanctioning of one’s counterparty is 
possible. These are the informal relational sanctions that have been studied by 
scholars like Stewart Macaulay and Ian Macneil. 252 
In the past, buyers would enter agreements and informally request information 
about supplier quality from other buyers or the suppliers or have the supplier 
pre-qualify before bidding or rely on the supplier’s reputation. However, there 
were not as many formal provisions for suppliers sharing that information on a 
continuing basis. The information sharing or acquisition might have occurred 
informally rather than being the subject of a formal contractual agreement. Even 
though many provisions for information sharing are now orchestrated in a formal 
document, the provisions are largely self-enforcing. In older agreements, even 
without as many formal sharing information protocols, the consequences of 
displeasing the buyer were the same: the loss of business or a reputational 
sanction.  
For decades, scholars have recognized that when suppliers and buyers had 
multiple informal ways of dealing with problems in the supply chain. As 
Macaulay recognized, the parties regarded suing their counterparty as a last 
resort. If there were problems with defective product, a kind of opportunism 
through shirking, they would raise the issue on a businessman to businessman 
level. Or they would agree to just give the buyer a credit for substandard goods. 
They might be part of a network of businesses that would furnish information 
about potential suppliers, which would solve the problem of asymmetric 
information. Parties could achieve the same confidence about their counterparty 
through repeated interactions with them. That would lower the uncertainties 
about their counterparty’s competence, provide reassurance on their reliability 
and decrease their uncertainty about the proclivities of the supplier to act 
opportunistically. They could, without the benefit of an LTA, identify forms of 
misbehavior or shirking that would cause them to lower their estimation of a 
supplier.  
So, in many cases, even without an LTA spelling out the information sharing 
protocols, buyers could secure this information in a variety of ways. They could 
investigate suppliers with other buyers in a network of buyers. They could ask 
suppliers to pre-qualify without putting these elaborate mechanisms in an LTA. 
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If parties were operating purchase order by purchase order, there would be really 
no need to make the obligation to buy going forward conditional on meeting the 
quality standards. Instead, the purchase obligation evidenced by the purchase 
order itself would be made contingent on the supplier meeting the standards in 
the quality manual.  
In many cases, those threats may be more than adequate to do the job, especially 
if parties are in a close knit relational group such as buyers and sellers in the 
diamond industry. But, if there is a dominant market player, like Boeing, those 
threats may not be as powerful and the presence of a dominant player may make 
informal sanctioning less likely. In addition, the threat to not do business with 
another party as kind of reputational sanction will be more attenuated or less 
believable if the party lacks information. Plus, in more heterogeneous markets, 
the relational informal sanctions may be less effective because gaining 
information or sanctioning more remote players may be more difficult. The LTA 
levels the playing field by requiring the sharing of information that makes it 
possible to gain the information that is the basis for either a reputational sanction 
or some kind of other self-help remedy afforded within the LTA itself. So, while 
informal sanctions can operate as a governance mechanism without an LTA, 
LTAs can enhance the effectiveness of such informal devices.  
It is important to note that parties entering arrangements of whatever type often 
resort to legal remedies only as a last resort. That was true 50 years ago and is 
true today. It is therefore not surprising to find informal governance as much a 
part of LTAs as they are also part of supply chains that are not governed by 
LTAs.  
VII. Network Governance 
Regardless of whether parties contract using an LTA with information protocols 
or operate purchase order by purchase order, suppliers and buyers may have 
other mechanisms for informal enforcement. One device comes from being part 
of a network that creates “structural social capital.” 253A firm can be part of close 
network, even if they are not part of a close relational contract that allows them 
to share information, which may allow them to sanction counterparties. This may 
be the case if they are part of a network which has been defined as “a set of 
connections between individuals or between organizations (here, firms).”254 Of 
course, if LTAs exist with information sharing mechanisms, the adversely 
affected party could share information about a supplier’s (or a buyer’s) 
misbehavior with the network and thereby impose reputational sanctions broadly 
— even beyond any relational contract that may exist. “When these connections 
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exist ‘they establish[] a link that lowers the costs (or raises the accuracy) of 
subsequent communication.’”255 
The presence of a network could affect whether a firm decides to enter into the 
formal information sharing protocols in a modern LTA. If a supplier or buyer is 
part of a network, it might be able to obtain information without the formal 
information sharing contract provision in an LTA. Presumably, there is nothing 
that would constrain a member of a network from complaining about 
opportunistic behavior or misbehaviors even without an LTA with information 
sharing protocols. Thus, being part of a network could possibly lessen the need 
for an information sharing protocol in an LTA. Presumably, firms would weigh 
the benefit of having the information generated by the LTA and the information 
that could be accessed through a network and then decide whether the costs of 
negotiating an LTA are outweighed by additional informational benefits not 
available by merely being part of a network.  
Firms can be ranked on how close they are in terms of proximity and centrality. 
“Two firms are said to be more proximate ‘when fewer intermediaries separate 
two counterparties.”256 These connections to other firms can provide an 
alternative form of private governance. The connections in a network allow the 
firms to circulate information about others in the network. These networks can 
be so effective as a source of information which can sanction others in the 
network for misbehaving that they can substitute for other protective devices that 
parties might use. In the biotech sphere, parties are likely to use equity to control 
behavior by agents such as founders of a firm. But, such equity participation 
declines when the biotech firm’s position in a network is central.257 Thus, the 
party can control opportunism through equity participation or through having a 
network position. The network position provides a way of sanctioning anyone 
who behaves opportunistically and that deters wrongdoing so there is less need 
to assume an equity position to control such wrongdoing through an ownership 
stake. The fact of the decline in equity participation in biotech firms that are 
“deeply embedded”258 in networks demonstrates that the network provides a 
means of controlling opportunistic behavior that may be less costly and more 
effective for the firm.  
The network has significant advantages because it works in situations that might 
otherwise present challenges for a network acting as a sanctioning mechanism. 
Sometimes information about a strategic partner is not in the public domain and 
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at other times the problem is the opposite one of having “noisy” information.259 
Studies suggest that networks can overcome these obstacles and transmit 
information within and impose sanctions on the basis of information that a court 
could not rely on to act. This would be true if the information were not 
observable or verifiable.260  
These networks can function to sanction both misbehaving suppliers and 
misbehaving OEMs or buyers. OEMs who are part of a network may find 
information about their bad behavior travels easily within the network and cost 
them reputational damage. Suppliers too can be constrained by the fact that 
buyers who are in a network can access information about suppliers from others 
in the network.  
The presence of a network is not a creation of or product of an LTA with an 
information sharing protocol. The LTA may operate in conjunction with a 
network and facilitate sanctioning by information transmission about failures of 
a party to an LTA to cooperate with some of the provisions. A buyer could tell 
others in the network of a supplier’s failure to permit a plant inspection required 
by an LTA. The LTA could require such access but the likelihood that the buyer 
could rely on such failure to successfully sue the supplier would be slim due to 
an inability to show damages.261 But, the buyer could cite such non-cooperation 
as behavior deserving to be worthy of comment and that could help the buyer to 
deter misbehavior that did not amount to an infraction that warranted a legal 
sanction. 
The presence of these networks could presumably operate even without an LTA. 
Suppliers and buyers who decide not to sign an LTA and are operating purchase 
order by purchase order could still rely on a network as a means of transmitting 
information about the other party to those in the network. The LTA, however, 
by providing a series of steps suppliers might take, might provide more sources 
of information about misbehaviors that could be transmitted through the 
network, even if the misbehavior did not warrant a lawsuit. But the network 
could also be used by suppliers and buyers to transmit information about 
behaviors that one party found objectionable, regardless of veracity. The 
advantage of a network is that the information need not be verifiable to a court. 
It is possible that even parties adopting another means of exchanging goods 
could use a position in the network to transmit information with a resulting 
                                                            
259 See Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 13, at 601-2 (the "information that is 
publicly available--namely outcomes--is too noisy to convey useful information to putative 
contracting partners given the low probability of success in such ventures and the wide variety of 
reasons they fail." 
260 Id. at 602.  
261 Id. at 603. 
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adverse reputational cost to the other party. Alternatively, being part of these 
networks could result in positive reputational gains.262 
VIII. Network Failures. Why Should We Care About Network Failures? 
Regardless of whether the supplier and buyer enter into an LTA or some other 
means of exchanging goods, such as purchase order by purchase order, all of 
these exchange relations will be subject to stresses and possible opportunistic 
behavior and will be subject to breakdown. A pattern of what one scholar calls 
“hedging”263 may emerge. 
The Article will look at why the networks set up by LTAs with information 
sharing sometimes fail or suffer from “partial”264 use and why those failures 
might cause parties to seek other arrangements or might prompt them to refuse 
to enter into the LTAs initially. These failures are undertheorized.265  
Thus, in studying framework contracts, one should be aware not only of the role 
of informal enforcement but also of some granular analysis of why with LTAs 
with information sharing protocols networks fail or underperform. When are the 
framework agreements likely to be unstable? These arrangements are not static. 
They may solve some specific problems, respond to problems of unstable 
demand, and dispersion of knowledge and cost pressures. But they may 
underperform because they are subject to same frictions as all exchange 
transactions like opportunism and partner unreliability. The “virtuous circle”266 
of the informal mechanisms constraining opportunism by increasing switching 
costs by the buyer and seller may not work.  
Studying failure gives us a window into how parties may react to some of the 
threats in a framework contract, which is valuable to a lawyer advising a client 
about participating in a network contract. Understanding how LTAs can unravel 
and understanding how parties react to possible frictions in the relationships can 
be useful to advising clients, because it can measure the risk of entering into such 
arrangement.  
                                                            
262 Id. at 604-605 (demonstrating a network of firms through a diagram; and, explaining that when 
there are more connections between firms, reputational information about the firms flows easily 
through the market). 
263 John Deere giving out a supplier of the year award. And due to John Deere recognition, this 
award was prestigious, at least within that “network.” Id. at 583. 
264 WHITFORD, supra note 29, at 100  
265 Josh Whitford, The Anatomy of Network Failure, 29 SOC. THEORY 151, 152 (2011). 
266 WHITFORD, supra note 29, at 99. 
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Why is there only partial adoption of framework contracts?267 Why is there 
hedging by both parties even when they are in an LTA? Part of the reason for 
partial adoption comes with the misuse of information by the buyer.268 In an 
ideal world the supplier shares information on cost reductions through 
innovation at the supplier level and that helps the buyer gain better pricing. But, 
if the buyer misuses the supplier’s information by sharing the supplier’s 
innovations with competitors, the supplier will hesitate to share information. 
A supplier may cut back on sharing information on technology or cost. It will 
“muddy the waters.”269 It will not share cost reduction information in a timely 
fashion for fear that it will just be subject to additional demands for cost 
reductions. So, a provision that was designed to achieve cost reductions and 
promote “sharing rules” may be subject to hedging by a supplier who cannot 
continually meet cost pressures imposed by a buyer.  
There is thus a spectrum of success in how the cooperative mechanisms flowing 
from information sharing protocols are implemented. The framework contracts 
are not a perfect system; they are not static. Interfirm agreements are subject to 
the same pressures and contractual hazards as all exchange transactions. 
Whether they survive depends on whether the benefits from joint collaboration 
outweigh the costs. 
Survival will also depend on whether the parties invest in coordination in the 
joint effort, as in the Boeing Dreamliner case where Boeing tried to cut costs by 
outsourcing more of the work to external players. Boeing relied on 50 tier I 
suppliers to play major roles in assembling different parts of the airplane.270 
Major coordination problems with the suppliers developed and led to delays and 
major problems. Boeing eventually took over one of the tier 1 suppliers and 
vertically integrated with it.271 So in representing a buyer who wants to 
outsource, a lawyer may want to build in as many points of contact as possible 
to ensure that there is likely to be adequate coordination between the two firms. 
Interdepartmental strife can foster “supplier confusion”272 and contribute to 
network failure. There are cross pressures built into firms between the 
purchasing department which wants to cut costs and engineering which wants 
the next new innovation and wants the alliance to succeed.273 These are hard to 
eliminate and suppliers should be aware of the cross pressures that might result 
and explain the risk.  
                                                            
267 WHITFORD, supra note 29, at 100 (discussing partial use of networks in response to 
opportunism). 
268 Id. at 103.  
269 Id. at 103-4.  
270 Tang et al, supra note 84, at 77-8. 
271 Id. at 75. 
272 WHITFORD, supra note 29, at 115. 
273 Id. 
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IX. The Importance of Contract and Legal Enforcement Remedies: What Role 
Should Courts Play? 
The informal extralegal governance of parties’ exchanges in the supply chain 
context and the breakdown or partial adoption of such informal governance force 
us to consider both the limits of legal controls and the limits of informal 
governance. In considering the prevalence of informal enforcement, contracts 
scholar Stewart Macaulay asked “Why does business ever use contract in light 
of its success without it?”274 Macaulay’s insights on the limits of legal 
enforcement derived from his seminal studies of Wisconsin manufacturing 
businessmen where he found they rarely invoked the law.275 When is it 
dysfunctional to invoke the law and when is it functional to resort to contract 
law enforcement? How, if at all, does the diversity of arrangements, the parties’ 
goals, and the uncertainties they face affect that question?  
This Article demonstrates that parties utilize a variety of arrangements. Some 
are enforceable legally, others, like LTAs without a quantity term, are not 
enforceable until the first purchase order is made. Of course, the cost of lawsuits 
is prohibitive, and informal enforcement by the parties exists even if the supplier 
and buyer operate purchase order by purchase order with legally enforceable 
terms, since the parties rarely resort to invoking these terms by suing a 
counterparty.  Often, parties will rely on informal practices to sort out problems 
that arise during the supply contract—for example, entering into informal 
arrangements for defective products. A supplier may allow the buyer to return 
products worth $20,000 per each delivery period even without the buyer’s 
actually returning the goods for inspection by the supplier.276 The cost of the 
supplier’s examining the goods for defects does not warrant the return shipping 
costs buyer would need to incur. Thus, an informal arrangement may occur 
where the buyer can get a prearranged reduction from its invoiced amount.277 
This informal practice might be similar to a more formal provision in an LTA 
that relieves the buyer of an obligation to buy if the goods do not meet a 
particular quality metric.278  
Whenever there is a pattern of informal enforcement, the question that arises is 
what the role of the court should be. Should it lend legal enforcement and, if so, 
to which parts of the parties’ arrangements when there is a breakdown?279 Should 
                                                            
274 Macaulay, supra note 36, at 62.  
275 Id. 
276 Interview 2/22. 
277 Interview, 2/22  
278 See Kraft MSA Section 8.3 
279 Lisa Bernstein has raised an analogous question in the context of relational contracts. If the 
informal norms break down, should a court continue to enforce these relational norms? She 
suggests no since the relational norms have broken down and been replaced by end game norms. 
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the fact that there are formal provisions in the newer LTAs that help promote 
informal enforcement affect the assessment of whether legal enforcement should 
be available and, if so, to what extent?  Should the court limit itself to imposing 
low powered sanctions, as the contract innovation scholars suggest,280or should 
it impose high powered sanctions and, if so, of what type and why?  
The general expectation in most contracts is parties will rely heavily on informal 
enforcement to ensure parties adhere to their contractual obligations. If parties 
adopt informational protocols that make informal enforcement easier and less 
costly, and the transaction costs of adoption are justified by offsetting benefits, 
have the parties fundamentally changed expectations about when and to what 
extent legal enforcement will be available? Even with LTAs that may facilitate 
informal enforcement, there will be contractual provisions that deal with issues 
such as indemnity, damage limitations, warranty limitations, and indemnity for 
loss to third parties. And, if such provisions are not covered in the LTA, they 
may still be contained in a purchase order. These provisions will be important if 
the relationship breaks down because of the misuse of information by the buyer, 
failure of the braiding mechanisms, or if the supplier or buyer is sued by a third 
party regarding a product that the supplier has sold to a buyer. So, parties 
entering into contracts, even when they fully expect that most disputes will be 
resolved by informal means, certainly do not forego the right to legal 
enforcement. One interviewee stated that the most important provisions in any 
purchase order are warranty, indemnity, liability caps, and IP provisions.281  
The fundamental question facing courts is what kind of enforcement is 
appropriate if some provisions are, at least partially, enforced by informal means. 
Answering that question requires an understanding of the effects of legal 
enforcement when parties have informal mechanisms for enforcing their 
obligations. Some scholars postulate that legal enforcement would “crowd[] out” 
informal enforcement.282 Other scholars have argued that legal enforcement can 
complement informal mechanisms and thus add value to the exchange.283 
The braiding contract theorists who emphasize informal enforcement, 
information sharing protocols, and the potential for crowding out argue that 
courts should and do play a limited role in legal enforcement.284 They argue 
courts should enforce only the part of the LTA contract that leads to braiding, 
such as the information disclosure protocols, and should restrict themselves to 
                                                            
Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for Immanent 
Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1796 (1996) (discussing end game norms as precluding 
incorporation of preexisting relational norms that preceded the breakdown of the relationship). 
280 Jennejohn, Innovation, supra note 5, at 357. 
281 Interview 2/22 
282 Jennejohn, Innovation, supra note 5, at 295. 
283 Gilson, et al, Braiding, supra note 3. 
284 Id.  
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enforcing such protocols, perhaps by issuing an injunction.285 Under this theory, 
courts should not enforce high powered sanctions, at least in settings involving 
collaboration on an innovation, since awarding expectation damages would 
necessarily sanction a party for the failure to reach the ultimate agreement. The 
argument is that there is no crowding out if the court declines to issue high 
powered sanctions but there would be crowding out if the court interfered with 
the “maintenance of the collaborative protocols.”286 The courts should leave the 
“collaboration protocols established by the parties…entirely within the province 
of the internally generated, informal enforcement mechanism.”287 Thus, if a 
party fails to share information, there would be a low powered sanction. Even 
under this approach, when the parties have deliberately breached the 
collaborative agreement to share information, and engaged in “a secret 
alternative process that undermined the trust…generated through braiding,”288 
then the court should police breaches of those obligations but should limit 
recovery to reliance damages. Expectation damages should not apply. 289 
This argument for low powered by scholars is premised on the idea that there are 
two parts to these contracts: 1. the information braiding and 2. the production of 
an actual product. For example, when big pharma companies collaborate with 
small biotech firms, contract innovation scholars argue that courts should be 
reluctant to grant a high powered sanction which would sanction a party for the 
failure to produce the ultimate product envisioned by collaboration because it 
would be an “attempt to regulate the nature or course of collaborative 
interactions.”290 
 These contracts combine “information exchange and dispute resolution 
mechanisms that support the informal contract—governing the search for a 
product—and the high powered formal contractual regime—governing a 
product's commercialization—which prevent the formal incentives of the latter 
from crowding out the informal behavior induced by the former.”291 The 
sanctions for the breach of the formal nested options for commercialization will 
not crowd out the informal sanctions since they cover separate matters. The 
danger of crowding out occurs when a court administers a legal sanction for 
                                                            
285 Jennejohn, supra note 5.  
286 Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note 3, at 1418. 
287 Id.  
288 Id.  
289 Id. at 1416. 
290 Id. at 1418. For a similar reason, courts would decline to enforce a purchase obligation when 
the supplier did not meet the excellence standards set by the buyer. In each case the initial contract 
would not predict in the case of a supply chain, if the supplier would meet the final target of 
quality and in the case of an innovated product, whether it would ever be produced. 
291 Id. at 1409. 
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breach of what had been governed by an informal norm,292 thereby potentially 
undermining it. 
Thus, in any case, where there is informal enforcement as in the supply chain, 
the question is what legal sanctions could or should be imposed without 
increasing the danger of crowding out informal norms. Resolution requires that 
the crowding out evidence must be assessed. Only then can we decide if the 
crowding out thesis should be applied to the supply chain for goods more 
generally and, if so, what implications would crowding out have for questions 
of legal intervention.  
In some ways, examining the collaboration for innovation—with its neat 
separation of the iterative sharing of information from the contract provisions 
for the final product—makes this analysis too easy to conclude that high 
powered sanctions would be inappropriate since that means awarding 
expectation damages that should only be obtained for the final product. The 
question is whether there is any basis for awarding high powered damages for 
conduct during the iterative exchanges. That inquiry has the most relevance for 
supply chain governance, as there are no nested options that neatly separate 
production of a final product from the iterative process that is governed mostly 
by informal sanctions. 
The first question with this is whether the evidence for crowding out is 
persuasive and relevant to non-experimental, real-life settings. Because 
arguments against enforcement of informal norms depend on experiments, they 
may have limited applicability to actual, non-experimental settings. These 
experiments study the effect of imposing a legal sanction to govern conduct 
breaches previously regulated by an informal norm.  
One study evaluated the effect of imposing a fine on parents who pick up their 
children late from daycare when picking up their children in a timely fashion 
was previously governed by an informal norm. 293 The study showed that the 
fine decreased compliance with the agreed on pick up time, which is a 
“performance obligation.”294 The study showed that the fine decreased 
compliance with the agreed on pick up time, which is a “performance 
obligation.”295 Higher compliance resulted when parents regarded compliance 
as a norm to be adhered to rather than a sanction to be avoided.296 This reduction 
in compliance may be because in settings where community norms are powerful, 
norms may be a low cost way of achieving the parties’ goals. Because norms are 
a low cost, efficient way to achieve a desired outcome, switching to a less 
                                                            
292 See Gilson, et al, Braiding, supra note 3, at 1400. See Iris Bohnet, Bruno S. Frey & Steffen 
Huck, More Order With Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust and Crowding Out, 95 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 131 (2001). 
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efficient—in this setting—method of policy enforcement through sanction may 
have necessarily reduced compliance.  
The arguments for crowding out based on this day care study have several 
limitations. First, the fine was misinterpreted by the parents as a license to be 
late. The fine gave the wrong incentive toward creating or reinforcing a norm of 
being on time. A fee that is viewed as a cost does not crowd out a norm; rather 
it moves the norm in the wrong direction. Had the authors of the study picked a 
different penalty, such as barring a child whose parent was late, then the penalty 
would have fostered a norm of being on time. The fine imposed simply fed into 
the parents’ self-interest in being late.  
Second, the arguments of crowding out are built on an assumption of a zero sum 
game in which we have either informal and unenforceable norms or we have 
litigation. Gilson, Sabel and Scott separate norm enforcement from exchange: 
“the parties’ behavior will change depending on whether they understand their 
interaction as norm based or exchange based.”297 Yet, every contract is exchange 
based and the parties will make adjustments within that exchange to new realities 
and doing so is a positive sum game as long as they share a perception of what 
their interests are and how to balance them against another’s to keep the 
relationship going. They negotiate in the shadow of legal intervention. If both 
parties share predictions about what judges would do, then the possibility of 
legal intervention will increase cooperation. If one party steals another’s 
valuable research, then the idea is that a lawsuit would be available. One party 
would be taking action that makes another party worse off. In such cases it is the 
right to sue that keeps the partners within reasonable bounds. The potential for 
lawsuits encourages partners to be reasonable (assuming that judges can identify 
which party is being unreasonable298) and their rules will induce (crowd in) 
reasonable accommodations and crowd out opportunism.  
Moreover, arguments for crowding out showing sanctions induce less 
compliance are misplaced for another reason. Weak sanction threats actually 
induced less compliance than cases involving no sanctions; however, high 
powered sanction threats did not result in reduced compliance, actually more 
compliance.299 It seems formal sanctions cause the trustees to experience a 
“cognitive shift” and make them “relatively more likely to make income-
maximizing decisions.”300 So, while crowding out of informal norms may occur 
                                                            
297 Gilson, et al, Braiding, supra note 3, at 1400.  
298 See Peter M. Gerhart and Juliet P. Kostritsky, Efficient Contextualism, 76 U. PITT. L. REV. 509 
(2015). But see Scott and Kraus. 
299  Daniel Houser, Kevin McCabe & Vernon Smith, When Punishment Fails: Research on 
Sanctions, Intentions and Non-Cooperation 21 (June 8, 2005) (unpublished manuscript available 
at http://ssnr.com/abstract788204 Increased compliance took this form: likely to return the 
requested amount. 
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and result in less intrinsic compliance with norms, the effect of sanctions does 
not necessarily result in the reduced compliance seen in the daycare setting.301 
Moreover, these experimental studies are based on gift exchanges involving only 
one exchange with no possibility of repeat play, and even they demonstrated that 
severe sanctions could induce greater compliance—albeit, with greater 
variance.302  
Questions still remain about how the threat of formal sanctions that are not weak 
will operate in an actual non-gift setting, where repeat play or access to a network 
might be possible. One should not necessarily conclude that sanctions in the 
supply chain context will result in reduced compliance, as even these studies 
show the amount of compliance depends on the severity of the threatened 
sanction. Furthermore, the cognitive shift moving parties away from interior 
norms to income maximization may still result in greater net benefits to the 
parties.303 Should we necessarily be worried if sanctions move parties away from 
interior compliance? Norms and interior remedies are a response parties use to 
minimize costs and increase surplus from an exchange. The tradeoff between 
interior enforcement and external enforcement may change depending on the 
cost calculus.   
Concerns about crowding out informal enforcement norms might also be 
misplaced for another reason. Informal enforcement of a pre-existing norm 
depends on a norm, such as truth telling, that parties have developed that can 
“constitute a bedrock of virtues that facilitate all exchanges.”304 Norms are 
powerful practices, such as a set of “cultural rules of behavior.”305 One such 
norm was a default rule that governed the Maghribi traders when the contract 
with an agent was silent.306 It defined proper agent behavior in agency relations 
and constituted an institution that “promoted efficiency by providing a 
coordination device necessary for the functioning of the coalition [of merchants], 
economizing on negotiating cost and enabling flexibility in establishing agency 
relations.”307  
The informal enforcement that results from the information protocols may not 
actually amount to a norm constituting an institution or a way of solving 
problems, such as honesty. Informal enforcement based on shared information 
might cause a buyer to refrain from buying goods under an agreement that 
permitted buyers to decline to buy goods that did not meet its quality standards. 
                                                            
301 See infra.  
302 Houser et al., supra note 297, at 26. 
303 Id. (discussing "higher expected return but with increased variance" when punishment 
increased). 
304 Kostritsky, Norms, supra note 23, at 486.  
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It might permit a buyer receiving the information to benchmark problems in 
production so as to make better products. But such a way of informally enforcing 
standards and solving problems while withholding any resort to legal 
enforcement seems to fall short of a norm that would result in collective 
punishment enforced by all who subscribed to the norm. Instead, the informal 
enforcement amounts to a kind of self-help for a single party. If looked at in this 
way, research suggesting that norms would be displaced by formal enforcement, 
and therefore the experimental studies on crowding out norms, may not be 
relevant in deciding if formal enforcement is justified.   
Even if one accepts (1) that crowding out can occur when the law sanctions—
perhaps with a weak fine—conduct that is subject to a pre-existing norm, (2) that 
those results could carry over to exchanges in the supply chain, and (3) agrees 
with the contract innovation scholars that a high powered sanction that tries to 
regulate the final product is inappropriate since it is not clear what the ultimate 
product will be,308 that does not resolve whether, why and when a court should 
intervene beyond enforcing information protocols or go beyond such low 
powered sanctions.  
In deciding on legal enforcement, this Article suggests reframing the argument 
about whether to impose high or low powered sanctions slightly differently. 
When parties draft any provision in a contract, the provisions are often designed 
to control certain risks/hazards that are inherent in any exchange. Some 
information sharing protocols are there to deal with the problems of uncertainty 
about the future behavior of the supplier: will it be compliant and meet standards 
of excellence or will it instead engage in shirking?309 Other uncertainties involve 
whether the supplier will be able to meet cost reduction goals and lower prices 
over time? In the big pharma context or another collaborative joint venture, the 
information protocols help reduce uncertainty about the other party and offer 
assurance that each party will invest in developing or funding a project. Without 
the informational protocols to reassure parties of such reciprocal investments, a 
party might be reluctant to make the initial investment. The provisions that have 
suppliers participating in excellence contests and gaining training on the buyer’s 
needs are all devices that the buyer implements to deal with the uncertainty about 
the supplier’s future behavior. These provisions may also have the effect of 
raising switching costs and making informal enforcement possible as the parties 
learn more about each other and learn to trust one another. There may be a build-
up of social capital and informal enforcement.  
                                                            
308 Gilson et al, Braiding, supra note 3, at 1402. 
309 Ronald J. Coffey, discussing “propensity to diverge” as a form of shirking. Email from 
Professor Ronald J. Coffey to Juliet P. Kostritsky, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve 
University School of Law.  
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But courts should recognize that these framework contracts governing interfirm 
exchanges are subject to the same frictions and stresses that afflict every 
exchange, such as opportunistic behavior, that are difficult to control by contract. 
And when the relationship breaks down, informal enforcement may no longer 
work since it is an end game situation.310 When parties adopt provisions for 
indemnity, or third-party dues, or a damage cap, they are specifically 
contemplating a situation where a lawsuit has occurred. All are end game 
situations. In such cases, the expectation would be that all legal sanctions would 
be available. If the parties have not ruled out a resort to the judiciary,311 it would 
seem that courts should be willing to intervene when the informal norms are not 
working to constrain a breach of a contractual obligation that does not relate 
solely to the informational protocols or is a blatant abuse that will deter 
investment.312 
The issue should be whether the law should supplement the informal 
enforcement. To answer that, analysts should consider that both norms and laws 
develop to solve problems and permit society and the parties to thrive while 
minimizing costs. Laws and norms are both “different ways of achieving those 
ends.”313 Intervention with law might be appropriate where some parties adhere 
to inefficient norms314 or norms that are ineffective or degradeing.315 Would the 
law be able to intervene to achieve those goals without causing costs that 
outweigh the benefits of intervention?  
The question for courts is “whether the non-governmental means are effective 
and self-enforcing.”316 “The government should use an analysis based on which 
                                                            
310 Lisa Bernstein argues against the incorporation of “relationship preserving norms” in an end 
game situation. Relationship preserving norms “are clear and well-developed, they may be quite 
different from the terms of transactors' written contracts, which contain the norms that transactors 
would want athird-party neutral to apply in a situation where they were unable to cooperatively 
resolve a dispute and viewed their relationship as 
being at an end-game stage ("end-game norms," or "EGNs"). Bernstein, Merchant Law in a 
Merchant Court, supra note 279, at 1796.  
311 In some cases, parties do rule out a resort to the judiciary. “The diamond industry has 
systemically rejected state-created law.” See Lisa Bernstein, Opting out of the Legal System: 
Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992).  
312 Of course, in devising a sanction, courts might consider research that shows that weak 
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law or which combination of law [including legal enforcement] would be most 
effective in cost minimization and achievement of parties’ goals.”317  
Sometimes the law’s intervention will result in achieving goals and solving 
externalities with cost minimization. If a law is passed that regulates dog litter, 
passing that law will empower informal enforcement.318 Without a law 
regulating the conduct, it will be difficult to control the externality because of 
collective action problems319  and the cost and difficulty of identifying 
peripatetic violators. The law’s adoption will unleash informal norms. Thus, the 
law and norms operating together can lower the cost of achieving certain goals—
like less dog litter at the lowest cost.  
If the conduct is blatant opportunistic action, as in Emisphere,320 then the answer 
as to whether the law should intervene is yes. The question is what we can learn 
from Emisphere’s outcome?  What does the court’s willingness to sanction Eli 
Lily for misappropriating research done by its partner biotech company for their 
joint benefit for Eli Lily’s sole use mean? Why did the court intervene with a 
sanction when the informal enforcement mechanisms did not suffice to constrain 
that behavior?  Why did it award the patent to the biotech company when there 
had been a blatant misuse of the its research?  
One lesson from Emisphere is that when (1) informal mechanisms are not 
enough to constrain opportunistic behavior, (2) there is a breakdown and 
informal norms are no longer functioning, and (3) the court can easily and at a 
low cost intervene to sanction opportunistic behavior because the behavior is 
such a blatant a breach of trust, the court will do so.  
But this would not be the case if the intervention would be costly. If one party, 
such as a buyer, uses cost information to pressure the other, the supplier, to 
reduce its prices, it would be hard for a court to determine if that use of 
information was opportunistic. Thus, the most appropriate method for 
controlling the misuse of such information is hedging by the other party, who 
                                                            
317 Id. at 494. 
318 Id. at 502-03.  
319 The New Palgrave A Dictionary of Economics considers a collective action as when 
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Innovation, supra note 5, at 357.  
 
 
70 | Page 
 
withholds information in response to what it perceives as a misuse of 
information.  
But if the buyer expropriates the supplier’s property, a court should enforce full 
expectation damages. That is essentially what the court granted Emisphere, when 
it issued an injunction against Eli Lilly and granted Emisphere a patent where it 
was clear that Eli Lily had appropriated the research work of Emisphere to gain 
its own patent. The court’s willingness to assign Emisphere the patent does not, 
as Professor Jennejohn suggests, appear to constitute a low powered sanction.321  
Gilson, Sabel, and Scott  argue that the court still imposed a low powered 
sanction because it did not interfere with the braided mechanism where informal 
sanctions were working, but rather sanctioned conduct that “undermined the 
trust that was in fact generated through braiding.”322 Gilson, Sabel, and Scott 
seem to want to leave the informal enforcement protocols intact and would allow 
intervention only when the action fell outside braiding because it “undermined 
the trust.”323 But the question is why and when legal enforcement should be 
applied when informal devices break down.  
Jennejohn explains the court’s willingness to award the patent to Emisphere as 
a high-powered sanction, not a low powered sanction, and as a response to the 
separate problem of spillover, not covered by informal enforcement, thus making 
the need to protect any braiding irrelevant.324 
Jennejohn’s argument for broad enforcement of LTAs says that, in considering 
a legal response, one must consider that these LTAs are comprised of many 
provisions. There are formal contract provisions in these agreements to control 
certain distinct risks like spillover, which is a kind of expropriation of property. 
Since a provision designed to prevent a particular problem is not there to promote 
informal enforcement, the way the information sharing protocols are, then there 
is no reason for a court to withhold legal enforcement of the provisions, and it 
should grant full expectancy recovery. 
There is another way to look at the issue of the appropriate level of sanctions. 
Courts should not be limited to enforcement of the information braiding 
protocols. They are there to deal with uncertainties and to control certain 
problems for parties (uncertainties about shading/quality of product) but 
sometimes whatever the protocols, whatever the arrangement, one party will act 
opportunistically at the expense of the other even when they have agreed to 
information sharing protocols that ideally will promote trust and social capital. 
Enforcing a contract that has provisions that may promote informal enforcement 
does not mean the parties intend to take legal enforcement off the table. And, in 
                                                            
321 Jennejohn, Innovation, supra note 5, at 357. 
322 Gilson et al, Braiding, supra note 3, at 1418.  
323 Id. 
324  Jennejohn, Innovation, supra note 5, at 358. 
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many LTAs, or in the purchase order that references or incorporates the LTA, 
there are important provisions intended to deal with contingencies when there is 
a lawsuit. Those should be enforced, as should the provisions related to distinct 
risks. For example, a court should enforce provisions about the expropriation of 
property that's boundaries may be uncertain or provisions to constrain 
opportunistic behavior that amounts to “red-faced cheating,”325 which cannot be 
controlled by the express information sharing mechanisms. Even though both 
Jennejohn and Gilson, Sabel, and Scott agree with some level of intervention 
(Jennejohn because of the distinct risk posed by spillover, and Gilson, Sabel, and 
Scott because intervention would still leave the informal enforcement structure 
intact and separate from a cheating situation), there may be another way to justify 
intervention that uses a different approach, one that is consistent with achieving 
the parties’ goals of controlling opportunistic behavior while minimizing costs.  
The  approach suggested here based on transaction cost minimization for 
achieving parties’ goals is broad enough that it could be used in a variety of 
settings. It should not matter whether we allow court enforcement that extends 
beyond informal enforcement because we decide that the conduct is outside of 
the properly functioning informal sanctions or because we call it a distinct risk, 
such as expropriation. What matters is that there is some conduct that cannot be 
controlled by contract or by informal sanctions when the gains from 
opportunistic conduct are large. In such cases, the parties would want to control 
that conduct if doing so can be done in a cost-effective way. When the breach of 
trust is blatant, as in Emisphere, the court should intervene because it can control 
opportunism without creating costs that outweigh the benefits.  
The idea that the law should control opportunistic behavior through intervention 
to control opportunism when the costs of doing so do not outweigh the benefits 
and control distinct risks, such as spillover or blatant breaches of trust, all of 
which is difficult to control by contract, finds support by analogy in the recent 
scholarship of Professors Porat and Scott. They suggest that in “spiderless” 
networks the control of moral hazard may be difficult to control by “legal 
mechanisms.”326 In such cases, they suggest a law granting a limited 
restitutionary recovery to limit free riding caused by externalities. 327 Of course, 
if such opportunistic behavior occurs in an ongoing relationship, one party can 
hedge or withhold information as a private response to the opportunistic use of 
information for one party’s private benefit.328  
But where the parties are at an end point, and a party plans to end the relationship 
by appropriating intellectual property of the other party, a low powered 
                                                            
325 Gilson et al, Braiding, supra note 3, at 1384, 1418, 1430. 
326 Ariel Porat and Robert E. Scott, Can Restitution Save Fragile Spiderless Networks, 8 HARV. 
BUS. L. REV. 1, 1 (2018).  
327 Id.  
328 WHITFORD, supra note 29, at 104-6 (discussing withholding of information as a counterstrategy 
to opportunistic use of information) 
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sancations to enforce the informational sharing protocols or a remedy limited to 
reliance would seem insufficient to deter opportunistic conduct. Where the gains 
from appropriation are large enough, the ability to self-enforce through 
reputational sanctions may be insufficient. So, while the formal provisions may 
facilitate informal enforcement, in some instances the informal enforcement 
mechanisms will fail. If the court can intervene to control blatant opportunistic 
behavior and can do so at a low cost, because the conduct is blatant, it should do 
so because the parties would want intervention to achieve their goals. Without 
the possibility of court intervention, parties would be reluctant to invest and that 
would act as a drag on gains from trade. The parties negotiate and will make 
adjustments in the shadow of the law and if the parties both make predictions 
about what a reasonable judge would do, then the possibility of legal intervention 
can increase cooperation. So rather than being a zero sum game where you gain 
from informal negotiations or you gain from litigation but not from both, in fact, 
you do not need to give up the advantages of litigation to have successful 
informal adjustments in a contractual relationship. 
 
Finally, one reason to allow contract enforcement beyond the low powered 
sanctions derives from the reasons for the existence of informal enforcement. 
Parties informally enforce provisions about the quality of a product, for example, 
because the cost of suing is too high. The parties are making a tradeoff. Informal 
enforcement may be the least costly way to achieve the parties’ objectives. But, 
when the harm is sufficiently great, the injured party may want to sue and seek 
high powered sanctions because the tradeoff is now different. In some instances, 
the harm will be grave enough to justify the legal costs, so enforcement should 
not be withheld. The experiments do not answer this, because they studied the 
effects of choosing to impose fines across the board on all parties who violate a 
rule (such a picking up children in a timely fashion from daycare).  
X. Advice to Client 
The spectrum of success in supply networks and the range of mechanisms that 
parties have for transferring goods have important implications for how lawyers 
advise clients who are concerned about opportunistic behavior of their 
counterparties and how to structure the transactions involving the sale of goods.  
Where the goods are not customizable but are catalog items, it may make sense 
for a supplier to forego signing an LTA, particularly if the terms require annual 
percentage-based cost reductions. The benefits of an LTA offering the security 
of purchase obligations by the buyer may not matter where there are not large 
transaction specific investments that can only be recouped by a long-term 
purchase arrangement. 
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The lawyer may advise the client to operate instead purchase order by purchase 
order. The parties can and probably will operate informally without resort to the 
law for many problems that arise. But, when the problems cannot be solved 
informally, the parties can rely on the key provisions in the purchase order or 
acknowledgment to protect their rights. The warranty, liability, damages, 
insurance and indemnity may be the key provisions according to one 
interviewee.  
Some parties such as OEMs may insist on LTAs. The lawyer should advise the 
client of how the LTAs may control opportunistic behavior by both parties and 
result in significant sharing of information that may curtail shirking by suppliers 
and also advance innovation in product development. The lawyer may also 
advise the client that the greater the degree of investment by both the supplier 
and the buyer, the more likely the relationship is to continue to be a productive 
one with switching costs. However, lawyers should advise clients that even 
LTA’s may be subject to partial adoption or hedging by suppliers if they feel 
that the buyer is acting opportunistically. If the buyer uses proprietary 
information supplied by a supplier, it may chill other suppliers from sharing such 
information in the future.  
The lawyer might want to advise the client that some framework contracts fail. 
Lawyers might want to encourage a buyer to make reciprocal investments in 
training the supplier if the buyer wants the relationship to be successful and to 
avoid what happened with Boeing and some of its suppliers.329 Alternatively, 
when representing a supplier, a lawyer might advise its client that these networks 
can fail when the buyer does not invest enough in coordination. In the case of 
Boeing, an automated communication system failed to produce the coordination 
that was needed to bring the Dreamliner to completion on time. 330 
There are always alternative arrangements even for a customizable good such as 
negotiating intellectual property rights to protect sunk costs or acting as a 
contract manufacturer.  
Lawyers can also offer one non-legal piece of advice that might be quite 
important: develop a unique product.331 It is advantageous for a supplier because, 
with a unique part, the supplier is not subject to price pressures or to buyer 
                                                            
329 Navistar, “mandates that its suppliers’ key personnel participate in various web-based training 
programs, among them a program designed to ‘take our quality expectations beyond statements 
of expectation to training in the important aspects of quality that will deliver to our expectations.’ 
Harley too has ‘a large variety of training types for [its] suppliers,’ including ‘a highly formalized 
methodology for instructing suppliers that can last up to three months,’ as well as ‘training for the 
Master Supply Agreement[].’” Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 13, at 579. 
330 Tang et al supra note 84, at 79–80.  
331 It would prevent supplier shopping, the manufacturer would likely commit to only one seller. 
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“shopping” “design improvements…to competitors.332 If a drawing is unique, it 
is hard to put it up for bid at an auction or to shop it.333 That means even in 
principle the buyer could go elsewhere, but it will not and the supplier’s 
investment will be protected.  
Conclusion 
Supply chains are subject to the same risks of opportunism as all exchanges. The 
LTA provisions for information sharing protocols may alleviate the problem of 
asymmetric information, reduce some of the risks of the unreliability of the 
supplier and reduce uncertainty about competence. They may also promote 
innovation and promote informal enforcement of contracts.  
However, there are other ways parties may wish to organize their contracts other 
than through an LTA with formal information sharing protocols but without a 
quantity term. Parties using alternative arrangements can still resort to informal 
enforcement mechanisms, even without an LTA.  Their ability to sanction using 
informal reputational controls will work best if there are ongoing relations or if 
the buyer and seller are part of an extensive network. A network may be effective 
even if a close relationship between the parties does not exist.  
If parties can achieve informal enforcement without an LTA, the question of 
why parties enter such arrangements persists. One answer is that parties who 
invest large sunk costs may be unwilling to invest without the security of a LTAs. 
Buyers may be unwilling to select a supplier without the assurance of a 
guaranteed price over a long period of time, at least where other suppliers are 
not readily available.  
But regardless of the formal arrangements, the relationship may break down and 
the question will arise, what role legal enforcement should have in these supply 
chains? My initial empirical research indicates that at least suppliers care most 
about the provisions that will limit damages, provide indemnities, and constrain 
warranties. The existence of informal arrangements will be effectively enforced 
through self-enforcement on matters related to quality and the networks can 
result in a virtuous circle of information sharing and learning by monitoring and 
self-enforcement. However, networks are subject to the same frictions as any 
exchange relationship and can fail. One party may appropriate shared 
information for one party’s sole benefit. In such cases, parties may privately 
protect themselves by hedging or engaging in only partial adoption. In cases 
where there is a breakdown when a matter is being litigated, the court should 
enforce those provisions that specifically cover litigated matters, because they 
are important to parties and parties never envisaged self-enforcement of certain 
                                                            
332 WHITFORD, supra note 29, at 117. 
333 Id. Also interview.  
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matters. Courts should also impose high powered sanctions if doing so will 
control opportunism that cannot be controlled by contract and the law’s 
intervention will achieve the parties’ goals while still minimizing costs. When 
the parties are at the end of their relationship, low powered sanctions may not be 
effective. Where the gains from acting opportunistically are high enough, high 
powered sanctions may be needed as for deterrence. This approach is consistent 
with the parties’ own tradeoffs. They reserve informal enforcement to cases 
where the costs of legal enforcement are not justified and seek legal remedies 
when the informal sanctions break down and the harm is great. Clients should 
be made aware of all of these issues so that they can provide effective counsel 
on the uncertainties parties face in controlling certain hazards, the private 
informal mechanisms that are available, the danger of failure in networks, and 
the type of responses, both private and legal, that may be available to parties.  
 
